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INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the verdict in the nine-month Lockerbie criminal trial
was announced on January 31, 2001, Libyan leader Colonel
Muammar Qadhafi proclaimed that he had stunning evidence
proving the innocence of the convicted intelligence agent Abdelbaset
Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi.' "And when I speak," he announced, "the
judges will have three choices: either to commit suicide, to resign or
to admit the truth."2 Qadhafi never produced his ostensible evidence,
though he continued to complain about the Lockerbie verdict,
leading one writer to editorialize in a British paper, "the Colonel doth
protest too much."3 If Qadhafi possessed such evidence, why did he
not present it to al-Megrahi's defense team before the end of the trial
or during the appeal so that a hearing of "fresh evidence" could have
been requested? Regardless, al-Megrahi's conviction ultimately was
upheld on March 14, 2002.4
1. See Her Majesty's Advocate v. Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al Megrahi and
Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, No. 1475/99, High Court of Justiciary at Camp Zeist, the
Netherlands (explaining that AI-Megrahi was convicted of the murder of 259
persons aboard passenger aircraft Pan AM 103 and of eleven additional persons on
the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland, in furtherance of the purposes of Libyan
Intelligence services, while acting in concert with others, but that his co-defendant,
AI-Amin Khalifa Fhimah was acquitted), available at
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/html/lockerbie.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
2. See Neil MacFarquhar, Qaddafi Rants Against the U.S. In a Welcoming
After Bomb Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at Al (quoting Qadhafi); see also
Lockerbie: Libyan Media's View, BBC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2001 (discussing the
reaction of Libyan state television to the Lockerbie verdict), available at
http://kimjgl.hihome.com/2001/02/02/world/0lLiby.html; Neil MacFarquhar, The
Lockerbie Verdict: The Libyans; Homeland Sees Political Motive in Guilty
Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001 (reporting that the verdict is seen as a political
statement to many Libyans); When Will Sanctions be Lifted, BBC NEWS, Feb. 1,
2001 (debating the proper recourse for the sanctions to be lifted against Libya).
3. See Arthur Shamis, It Seems To Me the Colonel Doth Protest Too Much,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Feb. 5, 2001 (commenting on the insistent protests of
Qadhafi over the Lockerbie verdict), available at
http://www.lybianet.com/n06febla.htm (last visited Oct. 1,2002).
4. See Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al Megrahi v. Her Majesty's Advocate,
No.CI04/01, Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary, para. 252 (stating that
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The world may never know if Qadhafi was motivated by a desire
to end seven years of multilateral, 5 as well as unilateral U.S. and
U.K., economic sanctions against his country6 that supposedly have
cost Libya $25 billion,7 or to prove that he is now a rehabilitated
"rogue who had come in from the cold."8 Presumably, however, the
Megrahi was allowed to present evidence of a security breach at Heathrow Airport
the night before the Pan Am 103 bombing, but the court held it was insufficient to
overturn the conviction), available at
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/html/lockerbie-appeal.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2002).
5. See S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3063rd mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/748 (1992) (deciding that all States shall impose on Libya sanctions
regarding the use of air space, transfer and sale of weapons, and diplomacy in
response to Libya's failure to comply with the Security Council Resolution 731
issued on January 21, 1992); see also S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3312th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (1993) (strengthening the sanctions imposed
on Libya under the resolution 748). See infra note 47 (discussing the significance
of the timing of the Security Council resolutions regarding Libya). See generally
STERLING JOHNSON, GLOBAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE 85-97 (Dartmouth Publ. Co.
1994) (discussing sanctions levied over Libya with respect to the bombing of Pan
Am 103); UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., Kluwer Law International 2001) (reviewing U.N. sanctions
levied on nations throughout the world). The resolutions imposed six conditions on
Libya: i) hand over the two suspects in the Lockerbie bombing; ii) resolve the
dispute over its role in the September 1989 bombing of French UTA flight 772; iii)
cooperate with the Lockerbie investigation and disclose everything it knows about
the bombing; iv) renounce all support for terrorism; v) accept responsibility for the
Pan Am 103 bombing; and vi) pay compensation to the victims.
6. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2002) (codifying the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act); see also 22 U.S.C.A. § 2349aa-8 (2002) (codifying the prohibitions on
Libyan imports and exports, which were first enacted in 1985, three years before
the Pan Am 103 bombing); 22 U.S.C.A. § 4856 (disqualifying companies doing
business with Libya from receiving contracts for foreign building construction);
A1-Sharq al-Aswat, London-Based Paper Urges Libya to "Self-Restraint" to
Promote Ties with UK, BBC MONITORING, March 24, 2001 (discussing the
shooting of a London policewoman inside the Libyan Embassy and the subsequent
sanctions in relation to the shooting).
7. See Rod Usher, The Law's Long Arm; A Scottish court on Dutch soil gets a
chance to try two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing, TIME, Apr. 1999
(reporting that Libya has estimated that the U.N. sanctions have cost it $25 billion).
See ALLEN GERSON & JERRY ADLER, THE PRICE OF TERROR 274 (Harper Collins
2001) (noting the cost between $20 and $30 billion).
8. See Ray Takeyh, The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, May/June 2001 at 62 (stating that Qadhafi's surrendering of the suspects
suggests that the international pressure prompted changes in his foreign policy);
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Colonel would not have agreed to any ad hoc arrangement to turn
over the two Libyan nationals and cooperate in the investigation
without at least considering the possibility that one or both of them
might be convicted.9 If he was convinced that they would be
acquitted, there would have been no need to delay the trial by six
months while seeking assurances about where and how they would
serve their sentences. 0 Qadhafi's agreement to the arrangement was
an absolute prerequisite to the commencement of the criminal trial,
given the lack of an extradition agreement between either the United
States and Libya or the United Kingdom and Libya.
Contrary to the Colonel's protestations, the Lockerbie
prosecution was not a show trial. It operated under the strict rules
and procedures long in effect for all Scottish solemn jurisdiction
criminal trials;" in fact, many of the rules favor defendants. 2 Indeed,
see also Muammar Qadhaf, Leader of Libya, Trying to Shape New Image, 60
MINUTES II, CBS NEWS TRANSCRIPT (July 3, 2001)[hereinafter "New Image, 60
MINUTES 11"].
9. See Qadhaf Vows to Accept Court's Verdict, BBC NEWS, May 3, 2000
(discussing the Libyan leader, Qadhafi's promise to accept the court's judgment),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/734460.stm (last visited Sept 6,
2002); see, e.g., Libya condemns Lockerbie verdict, BBC NEWS, March 14, 2002
(illustrating that Libyan officials denounced and rejected the Lockerbie verdict),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middleeast/1872578.stm (last
visited Sept. 6, 2002); see also Libyan Statement Regarding Verdict and Sanctions,
Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site, Nov. 15, 2001 (stating that the conviction issued by
the Tribunal was a political decision), available at
http://www.ltb.org.uk/displaynews.cfm?nc=2&theyear=2001 (last visited Sept. 6,
2002).
10. See infra Parts Ill A and C (describing the assurances sought by Colonel
Qadhafi).
11. See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (c.46) (ascribing the
procedure, including the rules, of criminal proceedings in Scotland), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl995/Ukpga-19950046_en_ .htm (last visited
Sept. 27, 2002).
12. See Fraser Davidson, Evidence, in LOCKERBIE TRIAL BRIEFING HANDBOOK
27 (John P. Grant ed., 2000) [hereinafter LOCKERBIE HANDBOOK] (noting that even
with the standard of proof being beyond a reasonable doubt, "it is a peculiarity of
the Scottish system that no-one may be convicted without corroboration"). "That is
to say that there must be evidence from more than one source to the essential
elements of a crime." Id. Moreover, in addition to "guilty" and "not guilty"
verdicts, the verdict of "not proven" may be given in Scottish criminal trials. Id. at
17. It is the equivalent of an acquittal. Id. These and other features led Alan
Dershowitz, who would later be hired to assist the Lockerbie defense on appeal, to
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in a 1997 independent experts' report to the U.N. Secretary-General
that was completed in anticipation of a possible Scottish trial of the
two accused Libyans, the Scottish judicial system was considered to
be a fair system. 3 While certain elements of the Lockerbie trial, such
as its venue in a neutral third country, Holland, and its use of a panel
of three Scottish judges instead of a Scottish jury, were unusual or
even unprecedented, these aspects were implemented to
accommodate terms insisted on by Qadhafi in discussions leading up
to the trial.' 4 According to the highest-ranking law enforcement
officer in Scotland, the Lord Advocate (equivalent to the U.S.
Attorney General), two months after the trial ended:
An early decision was taken that the prosecution would, so far as possible,
be conducted in exactly the same way as any other prosecution in
Scotland. The case was precognosced, prepared and presented in court the
same way as any other case. The principles and values of independence,
impartiality and professionalism followed in the trial were no different to
those followed by the prosecution in any trial in Scotland.'
5
Yet, the Lockerbie criminal proceeding was unprecedented in
at least two respects. It was the first time that a national civilian court
had ever conducted an entire criminal trial in the territory of another
conclude that Scottish criminal law is one of the most pro-defendant of any system
in the world. See Ron Allen & Geraldo Rivera, Trial of Two Libyansfor Bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103, CNBC NEWS TRANSCRIPT, May 3, 2000; Niles Lathem,
Pan Am Bomber Hires DershowitzJbr Appeal, N.Y. POST, Aug. 9, 2001, at 24.
13. See Report to the Secretary-General by Dr. Enoch Dumbutshena and
Professor Henry G. Schermers on the Scottish Judicial System, UN Doc.
S/1997/991, avaiable at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/373/73/IMG/N9737373.pdf.?OpenElement (last
visited Oct. 31, 2002); Lockerbie Trial 'Fair in Scotland'- U.N., BBC NEWS, Dec.
23, 1997 (discussing the U.N. decision that the two Libyans suspected of the
Lockerbie bombing would get a fair trial in Scotland), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/41882.stm (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
14. See Alistair Bonnington, A Truly Exceptional Trial, BBC NEWS, Jan. 19,
2001 (commenting on the extraordinary nature of the Lockerbie trial), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/I 126564.stm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002); see also
Analysis: Legal Firsts for Lockerbie Trial, BBC NEWS, Apr. 5, 1999
(contemplating that the Lockerbie bombing has resulted in an unprecedented legal
event).
15. Colin Boyd, Independence and Professionalism, UPDATE: LOCKERBIE
SPECIAL (Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service), March 2001, at 8 (on file
with author).
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sovereign country, 6 and it was also the first time that the U.N.
Security Council had pressured a state, through economic sanctions,
to surrender its nationals for trial abroad. 7 Moreover, two other
principal U.N. organs, the International Court of Justice and the
Secretariat, had been closely involved in aspects of the case. 8 Thus,
the trial was not merely transnational, i.e. the national trial of a crime
against national law involving alleged perpetrators from a second
state and victims from one or more other countries.' 9 The Lockerbie
trial was truly international in its promotion if not in its actual
jurisdiction or formal sponsorship.2" British Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook called the decision to hold a national criminal trial in a third
country "an historic innovation in international legal practice,"'"
16. See Robin Cook, Robin Cook: 'If the two men are innocent they have
nothing to fear from Scottish justice,' GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Apr. 5, 1999




17. See Andrew Hardie, Lockerbie - Briefing For Family Members, Address
By Lord Advocate (Aug. 23, 1999) (pointing out the unprecedented U.N. sanctions
on Libya designed to bring alleged offenders before a national court) (on file with
author). Cf Symposium: International Terrorism, Victims' Rights and the
Lockerbie Criminal Trial, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 15 (2001)
[hereinafter Symposium] (stating that the Scottish and U.S. indictments issued on
November 14, 1991, was the first time that prosecutors in two countries had
commenced simultaneous criminal proceedings).
18. See infra Part II and Part IliA (describing the ICJ and Secretariat's
involvement).
19. See JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 18-19 (2d ed., Carolina Academic Press 2000) (explaining that
transnational criminal law refers to violations of national penal law involving
perpetrators and/or victims of more than one nationality and/or which have effects
on more than one national territory). By contrast, international criminal law
normally refers to serious violations of international law, such as war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity, for which individual responsibility has
been established by international agreements such as treaties or customary
international law. International crimes need not involve any transnational elements.
Id.
20. But cf id. (stating that the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia
and for Rwanda have international jurisdiction because they are created by
Security Council resolutions, and thus sponsored by the United Nations, for
purposes of trying violators of international criminal law).
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while, in the U.N. Security Council, the delegate from Costa Rica
hailed it as "an intelligent legal solution to a longstanding legal
problem. 22
In order to bring about the Lockerbie criminal trial, various
multilateral and bilateral negotiations and statutory changes
involving the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands,
the United Nations, and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya were required.23
Some of these were legally necessary in order to establish a special
Scottish Court in the Netherlands where the two Libyan defendants
could be tried. Other parts of the arrangements were politically
necessary in order to clear the hurdles left by the lack of a relevant
extradition treaty.24 Yet, even negotiated arrangements reached for
entirely political reasons may, over time, take on a legalistic hue. It is
therefore important to appreciate their intent, meaning, and value
within the larger context of all the trial arrangements. Of the array of
special pre-trial developments that laid the groundwork for the
Lockerbie criminal trial,25 the pivotal role played by U.N. Secretary-
21. See Libya's Lockerbie Response Awaited, BBC NEWS, Aug. 25, 1998
(expressing that the decision to allow a trial in a third country is historical and
innovative to the international legal world), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special-report/1998/08/98/lockerbie/157780.stm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2002).
22. Transcript of Security Council meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.3920 (Aug. 27,
1998).
23. See Boyd, supra note 15, at 5. During the investigation of the case and the
trial itself, cooperative agreements between the Scottish Crown or Scottish police
and countries such as Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Jordan, Japan, Senegal and
Malta were also needed.. The Lockerbie case was the largest criminal investigation
in Scottish history, involving the greatest number of personnel, not even counting
the assistance of agents from the FBI and other countries.
24. See infra Part II (discussing the extradition lacuna).
25. See. Draft Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland Concerning a Scottish Trial in the Netherlands, art. 3(1),
available at http://www.ltb.org.uk/trialtreaty.cfm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002)
[hereinafter Neth-UK Treaty] (describing the conditions of the trial and special
provisions each government must adopt); United Kingdom Statutory Instrument
No. 2251, the High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) (United
Nations) Order 1998 [hereinafter "Order in Council"]; see also Symposium, supra
note 18, at 19-20 (discussing article 3(1) of the treaty and its provisions); United
Kingdom Statutory Instrument No. 3918, the High Court of JUSTICIARY
(Proceedings in the NETHERLANDS) (United Nations) (Variation) Order 2001
2002]
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General Kofi Annan and his designees in bridging the diplomatic
gaps between the United Kingdom, the United States, and Libya has
received little scholarly attention.26
After reviewing in Part II why a special arrangement needed to be
reached in lieu of extradition, this article concentrates in Part III on
the role of Secretary-General Annan and the language of his letter of
February 17, 1999, to Colonel Muammar Qadhafi: specifically, the
letter's annex, "Understanding on the Issues Outstanding from the
Point of View of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" ("Understanding"), is
discussed in detail. Part IV then assesses to what extent the
combination of special Lockerbie trial arrangements, including the
agreement facilitated by Kofi Annan,2 7 was purely an "exceptional
measure" 28 or to what extent might it serve as a model for future
trials in the field of transnational criminal law. Was the Lockerbie
criminal trial an early presage of future trends or was it "ad hoc
justice" -- an ill-considered example of the "privatisation of the legal
(technical amendment only). See generally Anthony Aust, Lockerbie: The Other
Case, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 278 (2000); Caroline Morgan, The Trial of the
Lockerbie Suspects in the Netherlands, 7 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 255 (1999)
(contemplating the process and provisions of the Lockerbie trial).
26. See Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on the Hand-
over of the Pan Am 103 Suspects (April 5, 1999) (describing the role played by
South African President Nelson Mandela, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah,
and others as intermediaries to persuade Libya to trust the joint U.S. and U.K.
invitation), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/99040508.htm
(last visited Sept. 30, 2002); see also John Roberts, Britain-Libya: Nelson Mandela
Breaks Impasse on Lockerbie Duo, INTERPRESS NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 28, 1997
(discussing the impartiality of a Scottish court). See generally WILLIAM
SHAWCROSS, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL 352 (Simon & Schuster 2000) (illustrating
the diplomatic measures taken by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in
extraditing the suspects of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing).
27. As explained later in this article, the "extradition by analogy" agreement is not
legally binding and therefore is not a treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(l)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679,
680-81 (1969) (defining a treaty to be an international agreement concluded
between States in written form and governed by international law).
28. See Letter Dated 24 August 1998 from the Acting Permanent
Representatives of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the United States
of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, para. 3
[hereinafter Letter Dated 24 August 1998] (describing the trial as an "exceptional
measure"), available at http://www.ltb.org.uk/trialletter.cfm (last visited Oct. 1,




order? '29 This final section includes a comparison of the Lockerbie
hand-over to another high profile case, the extradition of Slobodon
Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague, that
involved political and economic considerations.
Much has been made of one sentence in the Annan-to-Qadhafi
letter's annex: "The two persons will not be used to undermine the
Libyan regime."30 Alarmed that a "secret immunity deal for Qadhafi"
had been made, many Lockerbie victim family members and media
pundits pointed to this sentence or to rumors of this sentence, before
the letter and annex were released publicly.3' However, as argued
29. See The Lockerbie Trial: Legal Questions at the Commencement of the
Trial: Report of the Seminar at Slot Zeist on May 23, 2000, Amsterdam Center for
International Law [hereinafter Legal Questions at the Commencement] (stating that
Professor Kamminga considered the Lockerbie trial as an example of the
"privatization of legal order"), available at
http://www.jur.uva.nl/acil/LockerbieTrial.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
Professor Kamminga went on to compare it to privatized prisons, police and
armies. But these comparisons are inapt, as the Lockerbie trial was negotiated and
fully conducted by governments, not private contractors. Perhaps a more accurate
though less elegant term than "privatisation" would be "adhocization."
30. Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General, to Col. Muammar Al-
Qadhafi, Leader, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Feb. 17, 1999)
[hereinafter Attached Letter 3] (on file with AUILR and available at page 231 of
this article). The letter and annex have no official UN Document Number. Anthony
Goodman, Annan 's U.N. Lockerbie Letter to Libya Released, REUTERS, Aug. 25,
2000 (reporting that the United Nations, the United States, and Britain released the
Annan's letter), available at
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old-editions/08_27_00/for2.htm#f22 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2002); see also infra Part III.C.3 (analyzing the meaning of this
sentence).
31. See Goodman, supra note 30; see also Trial and Error, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, May 15, 2000, at 11 (discussing the supposed secret deal for Qadhafi);
Bruce McKain, Swire Says Claims of Secret Deal are Harmful; Lockerbie
Relatives' Spokesman Says Trial is Priority Number One, THE (GLASGOW)
HERALD (Jan. 7, 2000) at 12. See generally Michael P. Scharf, A Preview of the
Lockerbie Case, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 2000 (reviewing the pre-trial factual
developments and previewing the positions of each party) available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh44.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002); Ashour
Shamis, Lockerbie: A Sour Pill for Libya, BBC NEWS, Jan. 28, 2002 (discussing
the Libyan perspective and hopes for the Lockerbie case) , available at
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in-depth/ I 786608/stm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002);
Daniel Benjamin & Steve Simon, Seeking Justice for Pan Am 103, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, June 5, 2000 (rejecting the notion that the sentence at issue
meant a guarantee of immunity for the defendants).
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below, this particular sentence was never intended to preclude further
prosecutions of other possible co-conspirators within the Qadhafi
regime to include the Colonel himself. Read in its context, it was
merely an assurance that the trial will be a legitimate one and that the
two suspects, if they were convicted, would not be exploited for
political propaganda. Moreover, as explained below, any promises
within the Annan letter were not legally binding on either Scottish or
U.S. law enforcement officials. At any rate, whether further
Lockerbie-related prosecutions will be pursued is a matter within the
independent discretion of national officials, both Scottish32 and
American,33 based on their evaluation of available evidence and the
policy implications of doing so.
I. THE EXTRADITION LACUNA
Extradition is the official surrender of a fugitive from justice,
regardless of his consent, by the authorities of the country where he
is located to the authorities of another country for the purpose of
either criminal prosecution or execution of a sentence in the latter
country. Under international law, the duty to extradite depends on the
existence of a bilateral or multilateral treaty establishing the
prerequisites for and exceptions to such an obligation. 4 Otherwise,
32. See New Lockerbie Trial Ruled Out, BBC NEWS, Feb, 1, 2001 (stating that
Scotland's most senior legal official ruled out the possibility of any further
criminal action in the Lockerbie bombing case), available at
http://www.new.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/1148151.stm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002); see
also SUSAN R. MOODY & JACQUELINE TOMBS, PROSECUTION IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 56 (Scottish Academic Press 1982) (1982) (discussing the role of the
prosecutor in Scotland and the criteria which are used in deciding whether or not to
prosecute).
33. See US Insists Kadhafi Not Immune From Lockerbie Prosecution, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESS, Feb. 13, 2001 (quoting U.S. State Department spokesperson
Richard Boucher as stating that the U.S. position is to "follow the evidence
wherever it leads").
34. See Ninth United Nations Congress on the Preservation of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, International Cooperation and Practical Technical
Assistance for Strengthening the Rule of Law: Promoting the United Nations
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, U.N. ESCOR, 9TH SESS. AT 5,
UN DOC. A/CONF.169/8 (1995) [hereinafter Ninth U.N. Congress] (stating the
purpose and evolution of extradition and international cooperation), available at
http://www.sas.ab.ca/uncp/Documents/c1698.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002); see
also Torsten Stein, Extradition, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 327 (Rudolf
[18:163
EXTRA DITION B Y ANAL OG Y
there is no customary international duty to extradite. Moreover,
"customary international law contains no limitations on a State's
freedom to extradite, except for fundamental human rights....
Whether, beyond that restriction, extradition is admissible in the
absence of a treaty is decided solely under domestic law."35
In lieu of a relevant treaty, a state may rely on less formal policies,
such as comity or reciprocity, to decide how to respond to individual
extradition requests, or national legislation may specify what occurs
in the absence of a treaty. For instance, under U.S. law "in the
exercise of comity" and upon certification of certain conditions, a
non-national who has committed violent crimes in a foreign country
against U.S. nationals may be surrendered by the U.S. without regard
to the existence of a treaty.36 The U.S. has bilateral extradition
treaties with about 110 countries; there are no such treaties with over
eighty countries such as Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.3"
The United Kingdom has bilateral as well as multilateral extradition
arrangements with about 180 countries and its own dependencies.38
Bernhardt ed., 1995) (giving a historic overview of extradition along with outlining
the substantive law and issues surrounding extradition).
35. See Ninth U.N. Congress, supra note 34, at 6 (stating that international law
contains no limitations on a State's freedom to extradite except for fundamental
human rights issues).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2002) (listing the existing extradition treaties
between the United States and other countries); see also UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, TITLE 9-15.000,
International Extradition Matters (Oct. 1997) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEY'S
MANUAL] (outlining the process of international extradition and related matters),
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/15 mcrm.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181(2002) (interpreting extradition decisions); see also
UNITED NATIONS CRIME AND JUSTICE INFORMATION NETWORK, Database on
Bilateral Agreements on Extradition, Legal Assistance, Control of Narcotic Drugs
and Prisoner Transfer, USA (July 1996) (charting all countries and noting if there
is a treaty with the United States when it was signed and when it was effective),
available at http://www.uncjin.org/Laws/extradit/usa.pdf (last visited Sept. 9,
2002).
38. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177
[hereinafter Montreal Convention] (counting Libya as one of the 180 due to its
being a party to this treaty). See generally IVOR STANDBROOK & CLIVE
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Extradition treaties almost invariably set out specific conditions
under which surrender will and will not be granted. These conditions
often include the requirements of dual criminality and specialty as
well as exclusions for political offenses, capital punishment, or in
absentia conviciions.39 Some countries, however, choose never to
extradite their own nationals and to incorporate this policy in their
constitution or legislation. For example, Article 16(2) of the German
Constitution states that "[n]o German may be extradited to a foreign
country," and Article 5(LI) of Brazil's Constitution prohibits
extradition of native-born and naturalized Brazilians unless it
involves a drug offense or a common crime committed before
naturalization. 4  Article 493 of the Libyan Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that Libya may extradite offenders insofar as
"the extradition does not relate to a Libyan citizen."'" Traditionally,
STANDBROOK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EXTRADITION (Barry Rose, LTD 1980)
(surveying the law of extradition).
The United Kingdom's decision to adopt multilateral conventions aimed at
combating terrorism to serve as extradition arrangements with foreign
countries which are not already bound to it by formal extradition treaties may
prove embarrassing .... The implications of offering extradition
arrangements gratuitously, on a wide scale, without regard to the integrity of
the foreign legal systems involved, may not have been fully appreciated. This
is especially the case where the government of the requested country may
itself be involved in the alleged crime.
Id. at 335. This statement is directly followed by references to Libya and
Lockerbie. Id.
39. See, e.g., id. at 19-87, 150-155; see also Ninth U.N. Congress, supra note
34, at II - 20.
40. See BRAZ. CONST. art. 5 (LI) (stating that no Brazilian may be extradited,
except for natural Brazilians in the case of a common crime committed before
naturalization, or proven involvement in the unlawful traffic of narcotics and
similar drugs, as set forth in the law), available at http://www.uni-
wuerzburg.de/law/br00000_html (last visited Sept. 28, 2002); see also F.R.G.
BASIC LAW, art. 16(2) (contending that no German may be extradited to a foreign
country), available at http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/law/GG/ggl.htm (last visited Sept.
9, 2002). But see 18 U.S.C. § 3196 (2000) (stating that in the United States, if an
applicable treaty or convention does not obligate the government to extradite
citizens to a foreign country, the Secretary of State may, nevertheless, order the
surrender of a U.S. citizen whose extradition has been requested by that country if
the other requirements of the treaty or convention are met).
41. See Morgan, supra note 25, at 256 n.3 (quoting Libyan law regarding
extradition of its citizens); see also Letter from the Permanent Representative of
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to the President of the Security Council, United
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sovereigns have expressed four possible reasons for not extraditing
nationals:
first, the fugitive ought not to be withdrawn from his natural judges;
secondly, the State owes to its subjects the protection of its laws; thirdly,
it is impossible to have complete confidence in the justice meted out by a
foreign State, especially with regard to a foreigner, and fourthly, it is
disadvantageous to be tried in a foreign language, separated from friends,
resources and character witnesses.
42
The United States and the United Kingdom issued a joint demand
on November 27, 1991, approximately two weeks after their joint
issuance of indictments, for the surrender of the two Libyan nationals
for trial either in the United States or the United Kingdom.43 Libya
refused. It contended that it was not required to extradite and stated
that, in accordance with the customary international law principle of
aut dedere autjudicare ("extradite or prosecute"), it would conduct
its own prosecution of its two accused nationals4 4 pursuant to the
Montreal Convention 1971 that Libya, the United States, and United
Kingdom had signed.45 The British and U.S. joint demand was then
backed by a series of Security Council resolutions that Libya
challenged in the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") on March 3,
1992, by filing parallel cases against the United Kingdom and United
States. 46 Libya argued that by making these demands, the two
Nations, UN Doc. S/23441 (Jan. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Libya Letter to Security
Council] (outlining grounds for refusal of extradition and describing initiation of
Libya's own domestic judicial proceedings to take the two suspects into custody).
42. See Ninth U.N. Congress, supra note 34, para. 62 (citing Royal
Commission on Extradition, Report of the Commissioners, 1878 (C.2039) at 908).
The non-extradition of nationals has been criticized by a number of writers, for
example JEAN-CLAUDE LAINBOIS, DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL No. 458 (1971),
and Hans Schultz, The Principles of The Traditional Law of Extradition, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES, No. 9
at 19-20 (Council of Europe, 1970)).
43. See Morgan, supra note 25, at 256.
44. Cf supra note 38 (indicating the fragility of international extradition
treaties).
45. See Montreal Convention, supra note 38.
46. See supra note 5 (discussing the Resolutions of the U.N. Security Council).
Significantly, Resolution 731 was adopted on January 21, 1992, only three days
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permanent members of the Security Council had breached their legal
obligations under the Montreal Convention." The Court denied
Libya's request for provisional orders, but six years later, in two
separate judgments on the respondents' preliminary objections, the
Court decided that it had jurisdiction to hear the disputes on the basis
of Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Convention, which concerns the
settlement of disputes over the interpretation or application of the
Convention's provisions.4' The Court also found the Libyan claims
admissible. 9 The two cases are still pending on the ICJ's docket,
despite the completion of the Lockerbie criminal trial."'
after Libya had formally rejected the U.K. and U.S. requests, strongly suggesting
that the two countries had already planned on seeking Security Council
intervention. Resolution 748 was adopted on March 31, 1992, less than a month
after Libya had filed its International Court of Justice cases against the United
Kingdom and the United States, but before the Court rendered its decision on
Libya's request for provisional measures. Resolution 1192 was adopted on August
27, 1998, exactly six months after the ICJ's judgment on preliminary objections,
from which one can infer an indirect role by the ICJ in encouraging all the parties
to finally reach an arrangement that would lead to the criminal trial.
47. See International Court of Justice, Press Communiqu& 2000/27, Sept. 13,
2000 [hereinafter Press Communiqu& 2000/27], available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iluk/iluk2frame.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002). Quoting
Libya as stating:
[T]he Montreal Convention was the only instrument applicable to the
destruction of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie, that there was no other
convention concerning international criminal law in force which was
applicable to such issues between itself and the United Kingdom, nor between
itself and the United States, and that, in accordance with the Montreal
Convention, it was entitled to try the alleged offenders itself").
Id.
48. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie Libya (Libya v. U.K.),
1992 I.C.J. 3 (April 14); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie Libya (Libya
v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (April 14) (requesting in both cases the indication of
provisional measures).
49. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v U.K.), 1998
I.C.J. 9, at 54 (Feb. 27) (preliminary objections).
50. See Press Communiqu& 2000/27, supra note 47 (noting that the time-limit
for the filing of rejoinders by the United Kingdom and the United States in the two
cases concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie was set for August 3,
2001). Still to be determined on the merits is the "constitutional" issue of whether
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Thus, to transport the suspects to the Scottish trial court, two
voluntary transfers had to be effected. The first transfer was from
Libya to the Netherlands, and the second was from the Netherlands
into Scottish custody at Camp Zeist, a former NATO airbase in
Soesterberg outside of Utrecht. By a treaty between the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, signed on September 18, 1998, the
Dutch government agreed to turn part of its territory over to Scottish
judicial authorities "for the sole purpose, and [only] for the duration,
of the [Lockerbie criminal] trial."5' Under Articlel6(1) of the same
agreement:
At the time of the arrival of the accused in the host country [the
Netherlands], the Government of the United Kingdom shall, in
accordance with the relevant treaties, request the Government to transfer
the accused to the premises of the Scottish Court for the purpose of the
trial and to detain them pending their transfer, having regard to the
requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolution (1998).52
the U.N. Security Council has the power, through its resolutions, to trump pre-
existing treaty obligations. See John Dugan, Judicial Review of Sanctions, in
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6 at 83;
Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation ": Who is the Ultimate Guardian
of U.N. Legality? 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1992).
51. Neth-UK Treaty, supra note 25, art. 3(1). The agreement also states that the
jurisdiction of the "Scottish Court" is limited to this one trial. Id. art. 3(2). Article 1
defines the specific territory turned over as "the complex of buildings and land,
including installations and facilities, made available by the host country and
maintained, occupied and used for the purpose of the trial, including detention of
the accused." Id. art. 1(o). See generally Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Camp Zeist
Journal: The Dutch are Unfazed by a Scottish Incursion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
2000, available at 2000 WL 25027959; Gerard Seenan, World's Gaze Turns to
Camp Zeist, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, April 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL
19678353; Kathleen Nutt, How a Military Complex was Turned into the
Courtroom of the World, SUNDAY HERALD, April 30, 2000, available at 2000 WL
4103049; Symposium, supra note 17, at 21-22 (providing details regarding the
origination of Camp Zeist and the rationale for its location).
52. Neth-UK Treaty, supra note 25, art. 16(1); see S.C. Res. 1192, U.N. SCOR,
53rd Sess., 3920th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res. 1192, paras. 3, 7 (1998) (explaining that
the two countries must take steps necessary to implement the "initiative" for the
trial and requires the Dutch government to detain the two accused, upon their
arrival in the Netherlands, "pending their transfer for the purpose of the trial before
the court."). Although the resolution is dated August 27, 1998 and the Neth-UK
Treaty was signed on Sept. 18, 1998, the treaty was in fact negotiated and drafted
over a three-day period in July of that year. See Symposium, supra note 17, at 17-
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The agreement here uses the word "transfer" rather than
"extradite." Nonetheless, some specialists in Dutch and Scottish law
have referred to this short helicopter ride (from outside the Hague,
where the two defendants first landed in a U.N. plane, to Camp Zeist,
about 50 miles away)53 as having been either an actual extradition or
an "extradition by analogy. ' 54 The "relevant treaties" referred to
presumably include the 1957 European Convention on Extradition
and the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism;
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are parties to both
treaties. 5 Moreover, the two defendants formally waived their right
to contest extradition while briefly in Dutch custody on the afternoon
of April 5, 1999, and they were transferred to Scottish authorities
later that evening. The following day they were arraigned before a
Scottish Sheriff at Camp Zeist.
6
This explains how the two suspects were transferred from the
Netherlands to Camp Zeist, "the little part of Holland that [was]
18; see also infra notes 58-79 and accompanying text (discussing the drafting and
negotiating of the treaty).
53. See Reevel Alderson, Flight to Disaster, BBC NEwS, April 21, 2000
(providing background information regarding the pre-trial events and the trial),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/world/721674.stm (last visited Sept. 29,
2002); see also Symposium, supra note 17, at 18 (explaining that "[i]t would make
it clear that there was required to be an extradition process for the transfer of the
accused to Scottish custody").
54. See Legal Questions at the Commencement, supra note 29 (crediting
Professor Swart with creating the phrase "extradition by analogy," and noting that
Professor Nollkaemper explained that while the accused and any witnesses needing
to be detained were within the jurisdiction of the Scottish court, they would be
unable to apply to a Dutch court for habeas corpus).
55. See European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 273
(setting forth the Council of Europe's guidelines regarding the extradition of
individuals charged with crimes), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/024.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2002); European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (explaining the
Council of Europe's desire to end terrorism in the region), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/090.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2002); see also Neth-UK Treaty, supra note 25, art. 25 (stating that "nothing in this
Agreement shall prejudice the application of treaties on legal co-operation in
criminal matters, except in so far as otherwise provided in this Agreement").
56. See Symposium, supra note 17, at 20 (indicating that the Sheriff Principal
who performed these duties was Graham Cox).
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briefly Scotland. ' '57 Facilitating the first transfer, from Libya to the
Netherlands, however, would require much more than just a bilateral
agreement between two members of the European Union.
II. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INTERVENTION
The intervention of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan that
resulted in the delivery of the two Libyan nationals to the Scottish
Court in the Netherlands will be examined from three perspectives:
1) the temporal context-that is, the events, resolutions, and
discussions that resulted in Mr. Annan's involvement in arranging
for the surrender of the two men; 2) the legal context in which any
international official, particularly the Secretary-General, engages in
the activity known as "good offices"; and 3) the text itself, an
analysis of the two-part document sent by Annan to Qadhafi.
A. PRE-TRIAL DEVELOPMENTS
After six years of stalemate since the mandatory U.N. sanctions
were first imposed on Libya,58 events in 1998 would slowly coalesce
57. Hardie, supra note 17; see also Neth-UK Treaty, supra note 25, arts. 5-10,
15-21, 23 (stating that the Scottish Court situated on the Dutch territory, along with
associated personnel including lawyers, were granted 1) inviolability; 2) physical
protection and public services; 3) immunity; 4) exemption from taxes and duties;
and 4) unimpeded entry, exit, and movement within the Netherlands for all
required persons including witnesses and court personnel) "No law or regulation of
the host country which is inconsistent with a regulation of the Scottish Court shall,
to the extent of such inconsistency, be applicable within the premises of the
Scottish Court." Id. art. 6(3).
58. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the sanctions). Cf
Legal Questions at the Commencement, supra note 29 (noting that between 1992
and 1998, the only significant development in the effort to put on trial the two
Libyans occurred in 1993, when the head of the Libyan defense team came up with
the idea of a trial in a neutral country before a panel of international judges
applying Scottish law). Libya endorsed the idea while the United States and United
Kingdom rejected it, insisting instead on a trial in a national court in either the
United States or Scotland. Id. See generally RODNEY WALLIS, LOCKERBIE: THE
STORY AND THE LESSONS 167 (2001) (discussing the aspects of a trial in a neutral
country); SUSAN & DANIEL COHEN, PAN AM 103: THE BOMBING, THE
BETRAYALS, AND A BEREAVED FAMILY'S SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 249-250, 260
(2000) (explaining that variations on the proposal regarding a trial in a neutral
country were promoted over the years by Dr. James Swire, the father of a British
medical student who died aboard Pan Am 103).
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to cause a breakthrough on the question of how to get the two
Libyans into custody and before a criminal court. In late February of
that year, the ICJ granted jurisdiction over Libya's challenge to the
Security Council resolutions.5 9 In April, Libyan officials, including
Qadhafi, told one of the victim's family members, who had flown to
Tripoli to meet with them, that they were willing to hand over the
two suspects for a trial conducted under Scottish law but held in a
third country. Previously, Libya had insisted on an international
court or a court of Muslim judges.611 The newly elected Labor
government led by Tony Blair apparently was determined to break
the impasse; furthermore, African states increasingly were breaching
the air embargo against Libya.6'
59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the decision of
International Court of Justice).
60. See Quadhafi Says Lockerbie Suspects Must be Tried Before an Islamic
Court, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb.18, 1994. Cf Barnaby
Mason, Analysis: Lockerbie's Long Road, BBC NEWS, Jan. 31, 2001 (analyzing
the political tensions and diplomatic strategies that caused the case to span a
twelve year period); Lockerbie Relative to Meet Gaddaf, BBC NEWS, April 20,
1998 (discussing the meeting between Dr. Swire and Qadhafi); Libya's Acceptance
of Trial Offer Causes Disputes Among Lockerbie Victim Families, ARABIC NEWS,
April 23, 1998 (reporting the concerns of the plaintiffs' lawyer regarding the
proposed trial in a neutral state), available at
http://arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/980423/1998042357.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2002).
61. See Clinton confirms New Lockerbie Move, BBC NEWS, July 21, 1998
(explaining new strategy by the United States to support a trial in the Netherlands),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/136990.stm (last visited Sept. 29,
2002); see also Mason, supra note 60 (discussing the shift in U.S. policy regarding
jurisdiction and venue); Symposium, supra note 17, at 17-18 (discussing the
selection of the host nation). See generally 1998 World History, INFORMATION
PLEASE (2002) (listing the following events that occurred in 1998, some of which
may have been directly influential in convincing the countries to reach a
compromise: Ramzi Ahmed Yosef was sentenced to life for the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing (January); the Unibomber, Ted Kaczynski, was sentenced to four
life terms (May); Terry Nichols was convicted of the Oklahoma City bombing
(June); a treaty to establish a permanent International Criminal Court was adopted
(July); U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed and the United States
struck back at targets in Afghanistan and Sudan (August); Augusto Pinochet was
arrested in London, pending extradition to Spain on charges of crimes against
humanity (October); and Scottish devolution went into effect), at
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0777541.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2002). See
also Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir.
1998) (affirming that subject matter jurisdiction exists under the 1996 amendment
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On August 24, 1998, the U.S. and U.K. ambassadors to the United
Nations circulated a joint letter to the U.N. Secretary-General among
all members of the Security Council, requesting it to be forwarded it
to Libya. The letter formally proposed, "as an exceptional measure,"
a trial in the Netherlands before a panel of three Scottish High Court
judges.62 Two documents that demonstrated the seriousness of their
offer were attached. These were a draft of the treaty between the
U.K. and the Netherlands that would facilitate the transfer of the
suspects to the ad hoc court facility,63 as well as a draft of U.K.
legislation (formally called an Order in Council) that would confer
authority on the Scottish High Court of Justiciary to sit in the
Netherlands for purposes of this one trial.64 U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright stated publicly at the time that the proposal in
the letter was not subject to negotiation or change.65
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), and allowing
litigation brought by Lockerbie victim families to proceed).
62. See Letter Dated 24 August 1998, supra note 28, para.2 (indicating that
justice, peace, and security require that a trial be held in Scotland or the United
States). The letter also referred to the imprimatur of fairness, which the United
Nation's own independent experts had given Scotland's judicial system and
reiterated a "profound concern" at Libya's continuing disregard of the Security
Council's demands. Id. Finally, the two Ambassadors wrote that "[n]evertheless, in
the interest of resolving this situation in a way which will allow justice to be done,
our Governments are prepared, as an exceptional measure, to arrange for the two
accused to be tried before a Scottish court sitting in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands." Id. para. 3.
63. See Neth-UK Treaty, supra note 25, art. 16 (explaining the procedure for
the transfer of the accused to the Scottish Court in the host country).
64. See Order in Council, supra note 25 (calling upon the government "to take
certain actions to facilitate the conducting of criminal proceedings under Scots law
in the Netherlands"); see also John P. Grant, Trial Arrangements, in LOCKERBIE
TRIAL BRIEFING HANDBOOK 28-29 (John P. Grant ed., University of Glasgow
2000) (noting that the order confers authority on the Scottish Court to sit in the
Netherlands for the purpose of trying the accused).
65. See Anglo-US Agreement on Lockerbie Trial, BBC NEWS, Aug. 24, 1998
[hereinafter Anglo-U.S. Agreement] (quoting Madeleine Albright as stating that
"[t]he plan the US and the UK are putting forward is a 'take it or leave it'
proposition"), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special-report/1998/08/98/lockerbie/157536.stm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2002). The article also quotes U.K. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook
as stating that "[i]t is a way forward that holds out the prospect of lifting the
hardship of sanctions on the people of Libya - and ending the long wait for justice
of the relatives of those who were murdered." Id. Foreign Secretary Cook
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The joint letter was followed three days later by Security Council
Resolution 1192, welcoming the joint initiative and calling on all
states, particularly Libya, to cooperate promptly with it.
Additionally, it requested the Secretary-General, after consultation
with the Dutch government, to assist the Libyan government with
physical arrangements for the safe transfer of the two defendants.6 6 In
the Security Council session before the resolution was unanimously
adopted, the representative of Libya described his government's
fears and concerns about the proposal, but he also stated that Libya
"accepts that the two suspects should be tried in a Scottish court in
the Netherlands by Scottish judges, according to Scots law .... This
is a serious, irreversible position. 67
It would, however, take seven months for Kofi Annan, Hans
Corell, the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, and
other intermediaries to resolve all the legal and technical details
(including transportation to the Netherlands via an aircraft provided
by the Italian government) before attaining Libya's full agreement.
61
By mid-September, the United States was concerned enough to warn
Libya that the compromise offer was not open indefinitely; if the
tenth anniversary of the Pan Am 103 bombing passed on December
21, 1998, with no progress, the United States and Britain would
move to impose additional sanctions. 69 For most of the fall, secret
dismissed suggestions that the timing of the letter was linked in any way with the
acts of terrorism earlier in the month against U.S. embassies in Africa. Id.
66. See S.C. Res. 1192, supra note 52, paras. 2, 4-5 (stating that the Security
Council (1) welcomes the initiative for the trial of the accused before a Scottish
Court sitting in the Netherlands; (2) decides that all states should cooperate to this
end; and (3) requests the Secretary-General to assist the Libyan Government with
the physical arrangements for the safe transfer of the accused). The Resolution also
invited the Secretary-General to nominate international observers for the trial and
indicated that the Security Council would consider additional sanctions if Libya
did not promptly turn over the accused. Id. paras. 6, 8. See also infra notes 164-165
and accompanying text (discussing the issue of suspending and lifting sanctions
once Libya satisfies the conditions in all relevant resolutions).
67. Transcript of Security Council Meeting, supra note 22, at 4.
68. See, e.g., Aust, supra note 25, at 293, n. 54 (indicating that Italy, according
to the arrangement made with the Netherlands, provided the aircraft to the United
Nations).
69. See Lockerbie Campaigner Flies to Libya for Talks, BBC NEWS, Sept. 20,
1998, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/world/middleeast/175703.stm (last
visited Oct. 5, 2002); Lockerbie Suspects' Lawyers "Sacked, " Lockerbie Trial
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discussions took place in New York City between Corell and a
Libyan legal team headed by Libya's ambassador to the United
Nations, Abuzeid Dorda. Among the issues debated was Libya's
concern about how its two nationals would be treated should they be
convicted. 0 The Libyan legal team wanted them to serve any
potential sentences in Libya due to fears of prejudicial treatment in
the British prison system.
With the tenth anniversary of the bombing approaching, the
United Kingdom agreed to some concessions on the subject of
Scottish imprisonment. These compromises included visits by the
defendants' family members, U.N. observers, and Libyan officials,
and accommodations for observing the Islamic faith.7' In early
Briefing Site, Sept. 25, 1998 (reporting that the Libyans' defense counsel had been
changed, leading to speculation that Gadhafi wanted to ensure that the two
suspects agree to the trial in the Netherlands so as to ensure the lifting of
sanctions), available at
http://www.ltb.org.uk/displaynews.cfm?nc=8&theyear=1998 (last visited Oct. 5,
2002).
70. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 26, at 344-45 (explaining that the Libyan
government did not want the suspects serving sentences in Britain); see also
Morgan, supra note 25, at 262 (stating that "[o]ne of the contentious issues had
been the place where a sentence, if any, was to be served" and that the Libyan
request for any sentence to be served in a third county to avoid prejudice against
the suspects was denied); Gadhafi Journeys to Egypt for talks on Lockerbie
Suspects, CNN, March 5, 1999 (indicating that Libya was apparently also
concerned that the suspects would be "interrogated by U.S. authorities or taken to
the United States once they were outside of Libya"), available at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9903/05/egypt.libya/ (last visited Nov. 1,
2002); Legal Questions at the Commencement, supra note 29 (discussing a
comment by Robert Black about the Libyan concern that "the accused might be
removed from Scottish territory by special forces of other states or that their safety
was otherwise not guaranteed").
71. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 26, at 345 (explaining that one such
concession was to fully accommodate the suspects Islamic faith); see also Q&A:
Life in a Scottish Jail, BBC NEWS, March 15, 2002 (reporting that like all
convicted prisoners in Scotland, the suspect would be able to practice his religion,
enjoy family visits, and benefit from the prison's welfare program), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Scotland/1873886.stm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002);
'Irony' of Bomber's Jail Treatment, BBC NEWS, March 14, 2002 (describing that
although the conditions in Barlinnie have been called "appalling" the suspects are
expected to receive better treatment than other inmates in Scottish jails), available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/world/1868930.stm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002);
Marcello Mega, Lockerbie Bomber Cooks Up Libyan Meals, SCOTLAND ON
SUNDAY, March 24, 2002 (reporting that after one week in Barlinnie prison,
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December 1998, as Kofi Annan prepared to go to Tripoli to meet
personally with Qadhafi and Libyan Foreign Ministry officials, both
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright reminded the Secretary-General that he had no
authority to negotiate and that he should make no "package deals."72
Annan was reportedly "at pains not to get involved in a negotiation;
he merely passed on questions and answers." 3
According to one of eight journalists who accompanied the
Secretary-General on the trip, Annan assured Libyan officials that
the Americans were not going to kidnap the two suspects and take
them to the United States. Annan also told them that Great Britain
had a "strong legal tradition" and Scottish "prosecutors and judges
will not want to embarrass themselves. 7 4 The Libyans continued to
insist that Libya be the place of detention instead of Scotland. Annan
reportedly responded:
On that I have no room for maneuver. We have had assurances that the
imprisonment will be open and transparent, and you and the [suspects']
families can visit. What we can ask for is fair treatment. Once you've
taken the major step of accepting a Scottish trial, the rest follows. A lot of
governments which have supported you will be very disappointed if you
allow it to stick now.
75
Megrahi had been cooking his own special foods and making unlimited phone calls
home), available at 2002 WL 8201757.
72. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 26, at 346 (quoting Madeleine Albright, "[w]e
do not want a package"); see also Hardie, supra note 17, at 5 ("We would not
negotiate, directly or indirectly, with accused persons or the government which
allegedly employed them as to the kind of trial which they would find
appropriate... I would not have agreed to any deals with Libya or the accused
which affected the trial.").
73. Aust, supra note 25, at 293 (explaining that Kofi Annan largely relayed the
responses of the British, the Dutch, the French, and the U.S. governments to legal
and practical questions that Libya raised during its interaction with the U.N. Legal
Counsel).
74. SHAWCROSS, supra note 26, at 348. Shawcross's description of the trip
depicts Annan's finesse in flattering Qadhafi, who ended their meeting by telling
the U.N. executive that "I am prepared to try to work this out with you, not
because you are the secretary general or because of threats against us, but because
of the man you are, a brother African from a friendly state." Id. at 351.
75. Id. at 349 (quoting Kofi Annan in response to the Libyan Foreign
Minister's concerns about the two men's place of detention).
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The Secretary-General described the purpose of the visit as
"confidence building." 6 After leaving Libya on December 10 th,
Annan met with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and South African
President Mandela to ask formally for their involvement in resolving
the continuing impasse.7
Although a jet had been waiting on standby in Italy while Annan
was in Libya, it would take another five months before the Secretary-
General and his staff would oversee the actual transfer of the two
suspects to the Netherlands on April 5, 1999.78 Libya's parliament,
the People's Congress, ratified the agreement in principle in mid-
December, but the issue of where the sentences would be served and
related details remained in contention.7 9 The precise problems can be
76. See id. at 351 (noting that Libyan officials and lawyers dealing with the
situation agreed with Annan's assessment and the foreign ministry described
settlement as "close" after the talks).
77. See Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at
Headquarters, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6944 (April 5, 1999) [hereinafter Press
Conference Transcript].
78. See Stephen Breen, Jet on Standby for Lockerbie Suspects Deal, THE
SCOTSMAN, Dec. 5, 1998 (explaining that the jet on stand by was an Italian jet, and
because Libya and Italy enjoy good relations, Libya would not want to hand over
the suspects to the United States), available at 1998 WL 23225493; see also
Secretary-General Holds Meeting with Muammar al-Qadhafi on Question of
Possible Transfer of Lockerbie Suspects, U.N. Doc. SG/T/2161 (Dec. 9, 1998);
Libya "Studying" Proposed Handover of Lockerbie Suspects, CNN, March 1,
1999 [hereinafter Libya Studying Proposed Handover] (reporting that at the end of
February 1999, the United States and United Kingdom gave Libya a thity-day
deadline, under the threat of further sanctions), available at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9903/01/un.libya/index.html (last visited
Nov. 1,2002).
79. See Abdelaziz Barrouhi, Libyan Congress Oks Lockerbie Trial, REUTERS,
Dec. 15, 1998 (noting that the 500-member Congress sets policy guidelines, and
stating that "[a]though Libya's Political Structure stresses the weight of grassroots
opinion, the system as a whole generally keeps step with Gadhafi's semi-official
guidance"); see also No Lockerbie Jail Deal, BBC NEWS, Dec. 21, 1998
(explaining that at the same time, U.K. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook continued to
insist that there would be no compromise on where the two suspects, "if convicted,
should serve their sentence in a Scottish prison), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/239597.stm (last visited Nov. 1, 2002). Continuing,
"[a]fter all, this offense took place in Scottish jurisdiction." Id. See also Lockerbie:
"Any Jail Term Must be Served in Scotland, BBC NEWS, Feb. 8, 1999 [hereinafter
Any Jail Term] (reporting that Foreign Secretary Cook's position is that there is
"no alternative" to a prison term in Scotland), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-politics/275519.stm (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
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inferred from the text of the letter and its annex that Kofi Annan sent
to Muammar Qadhafi on February 17, 1999. Before turning to that, it
is useful to understand the scope, status, and parameters of the
Secretary-General's power to mediate an international dispute.
B. THE "GOOD OFFICES" FUNCTION
When a diplomat, an international civil servant, an organization, or
a state or a group of states acts quietly behind the scenes to attempt
to prevent or resolve an international crisis by peaceful means, they
are exercising the function of "good offices." The concept of good
offices, a term of art within international law, has been defined as,
"[a]n effort by a state, or by an international organization or other
entity, not itself involved in the dispute, to stimulate the process of
settlement in such a dispute between two or more other states."80
Good offices usually are directed at opening channels of
communication between the disputing parties, "thus paving the way
for direct, bilateral diplomacy .... It differs from adjudication and
arbitration in that its object is to stimulate diplomatic dialogue
between the contending parties and not to stipulate settlement
provisions or to provide means for their implementation."'" Good
offices also differ from mediation in that it involves active
participation of the third party in the negotiation process between the
two disputants.82
In that sense, the good offices mission may be closer to
conciliation, which "presupposes that the conciliator is impartial, has
no direct interests of his own at stake in the dispute, and will not
itself intervene to alter the calculus of the parties."83 Moreover, good
offices are voluntary on the part of the participants. "There is no
obligation to offer the service or to accept the tender of good offices.
The technique of good offices may be exercised only with the
80. CHARLES W. FREEMAN, JR., THE DIPLOMAT'S DICTIONARY 126 (1997); see
also JAMES F. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 128
(1997) ("friendly efforts on the part of a third state or international organization to
try to encourage disputing states to enter into or resume negotiations").
81. GRAHAM EVANS & JEFFREY NEWNHAM, THE PENQUIN DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 206-207 (1998).
82. See id.
83. FREEMAN, supra note 80, at 51.
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consent of both parties to the dispute. 8 4 Likewise, the good offices
function constitutes the giving of advice; its results never have
binding force.85
Although good offices are voluntary, their mandate was laid out in
Articles 4 through 8 of both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.86 These articles
are virtually identical in both conventions, and they cover "good
offices and mediation" together, even though some of the individual
provisions mention only one or the other function. After indicating
that Contracting Parties to either Convention have the right to offer
good offices or mediation to states that are engaged in or are about to
go to war, the Conventions provide:
Article 4
The part of the mediator consists in reconciling the opposing claims and
appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen between the
States at variance.
Article 5
The functions of the mediator are at an end when once it is declared,
either by one of the parties to the dispute, or by the mediator himself, that
the means of reconciliation proposed by him are not accepted.
Article 6
Good offices and mediation, either at the request of the parties at
variance, or on the initiative of Powers strangers to the dispute, have
exclusively the character of advice and never have binding force.
8 7
84. Fox, supra note 80, at 128.
85. See EVANS & NEWNHAM, supra note 81, at 207.
86. See Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, 32 Stat. 1779 (1899), 54 L.N.T.S. 435 (1907) (setting forth the
requirements for good offices).
87. See id. at 1785-86.
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Articles 7 and 8 deal specifically with mediation during, or right
before, the outbreak of military hostilities. Later articles of the 1899
Convention address other methods of peaceful dispute settlement,
including commissions of inquiry and international arbitration.88
During the latter part of the twentieth century, the U.N.
Secretary-General, alone and through his designees, was one of the
most prominent employers of the good offices function. The U.N.
public information web-site describes the Secretary-General's good
offices, conducted both publicly and privately, as "one of the most
vital roles [he] plays," thus "drawing upon his independence,
impartiality and integrity, to prevent international disputes from
arising, escalating or spreading."8 9 In the words of Javier Perez de
Cu~llar, the Secretary-General in office during the Pan Am 103
bombing, the general political functions of the world's leading civil
servant position depend on "courage, prudence and fidelity to the
aims of the [U.N.] Charter. This elasticity, if I may call it that, is not
peculiar to this office: in varying degrees, it occurs in any institution
which has to respond to the complexity of human affairs." 9° Good
offices have been described as "informal, loosely structured and, to a
large extent, depend on the flexibility, sensitivity and
imaginativeness of the good officer. The successful good officer thus
usually demands the authority to operate within a wide margin of
discretion." 91 Ideally, the Secretary-General can be a "catalyst for
88. See generally ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE 1899 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE:
"THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN, THE FEDERATION OF THE WORLD" 358-359 (1999)
(discussing alternative dispute resolution practices, including good offices and
mediation).
89. The Role of the Secretary-General, at
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/pages/sg-office.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002);
see also Secretary-General Sets Course for Long-Awaited UN Revitalization:
General Assembly Fully Supportive of Reforms (discussing future changes to the
United Nations, including "[i]n the area of peace and security, supporting the
efforts by the Secretary-General and the Security Council to prevent conflicts and
to enhance the Organization's information-gathering and rapid deployment
capacity"), at http://www.un.org/reform/! focus.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
90. Javier Perez de Cu~llar, The Role of the UN Secretary-General, in UNITED
NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE UN'S ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 125-
26 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993).
91. Thomas M. Franck & George Nolte, The Good Offices Function of the UN
Secretary-General, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 143, 174 (Adam Roberts
& Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993).
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compromise, a formulator of structures for their implementation, and
a resource that enables the parties, when agreement has been
reached, to present it to disaffected parts of their domestic
constituencies as the product of an irresistible global consensus."92
Although the Secretary-General's good offices mission has been
described as "one of the most important functions of the U.N."93 and
has expanded since the end of the Cold War,94 the phrase "good
offices" does not appear in the U.N. Charter. It is not listed in Article
33 (1) that notes seven other specific methods of settling disputes
peacefully.95 The Secretariat is mentioned in Article 7 as one of the
six principal organs of the United Nations, and the Secretary-General
is given discreet functions in Articles 12(2), 20 and 73(e). However,
the Organization's chief job position is not described
92. Id. at 179.
93. Id. at 143.
94. See id. at 144-72 (listing seventeen separate international conflicts between
1988 and 1992 in which the Secretary-General or his staff contributed to the easing
of tensions, including Afghanistan, Cyprus, the Falkland Islands/Malvinas,
Namibia, the Rainbow Warrior dispute, and the Iran-Iraq war, and describing only
a handful of such interventions between 1946 and 1987); see also Security Council
Adopts Resolutions Regarding Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in
Cyprus and UNFICYP Mandate, U.N. Doc. SC/6694 (June 29, 1999); CAMERON
R. HUME, A PATH TO PEACE: ENDING MOZAMBIQUE'S WAR, THE ROLE OF
MEDIATION AND GOOD OFFICES 118-124 (1994); RAYMOND R. PROBST, "GOOD
OFFICES" IN THE LIGHT OF SWISS INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND EXPERIENCE 81-
83 (1989); ERIK JENSEN, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S USE OF GOOD OFFICES AND
THE QUESTION OF BAHRAIN (1985); B.G. RAMCHARAN, HUMANITARIAN GOOD
OFFICES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-36 (1983) (providing other descriptions of the
exercise of good offices by the Secretary-General and others). Good offices have
been exercised by U.N. bodies other than the Secretary-General, such as the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and by other international
bodies such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See Anti-
Discrimination Committee Decides on Process of Consultation with Bosnia and
Herzegovina: To Resume Good Offices on Kosovo, U.N. Doc. RD/868 (Mar. 14,
1996); Miriam Sapiro, ASIL Insights: Dispute Resolution: General Methods and
CSCE Mechanisms, AM. SOCIETY INT'L. L. NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1994; Miriam
Sapiro, The OSCE: An Essential Component of European Security (Mar. 1997),
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insight8.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
95. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 33, para. 1 (stating that "[t]he parties to any
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice").
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comprehensively until Articles 97 to 101 in chapter XV. 9 6 Most of
these articles, however, address the position's administrative
functions. Only Articles 99 and 100 come close to alluding to the
political and discretionary role of the Secretary-General:
Article 99
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council
any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Article 100
In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall
not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other
authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action
which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible
only to the Organization.
Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively
international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and
the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their
responsibilities.
97
The Secretary-General thus has, to some degree, an over-lapping
jurisdiction with the Security Council to monitor international peace
and security. But unlike the individual members of the Council, the
Secretary-General is an international official responsible to the
Organization itself and not to any particular government. Moreover,
as head of one of the U.N.'s principal organs, he is "co-responsible"
with the other five bodies "for achieving the organization's aims and
purposes." 98 Perez de Cu~llar explains that, due to the break-down
between permanent members of the Security Council during the Cold
War, the Secretary-General had to improvise ways to keep channels
96. See id., art. 12, para. 2, art. 20, art. 73, para. e (setting forth some of the
functions of the Secretary-General).
97. Id. arts. 99-100.
98. Perez de Cu~llar, supra note 90, at 127.
[18:163
EXTRADITION B YANALOGY
of communication and conflict resolution open.99 Thus, the good
offices function grew organically from context and necessity, as part
of the Secretary-General's "evolving constitutional role within the
U.N. system."'' 0 Interstices of Charter Articles 33 and 99, Security
Council and General Assembly resolutions, and "an emanation of his
inherent powers, or by agreement of disputatious parties" also can be
credited for developing the Secretariat's good offices function. 10 1
P6rez de Cu~llar has stated that the Secretary-General's
multilateral diplomacy differs from traditional state-to-state
diplomacy in the following respect:
As it is conducted in accordance with the principles of the [U.N.] Charter,
it does not place the weaker party in an unfavorable position. It seeks an
objective and lasting settlement of a dispute and not merely one which
responds to the expediencies of the day .... When states are in conflict,
the Secretary-General has to try to understand the roots of insecurity, the
fears and resentments and the legitimate aspirations which inspire a
people or a state to take the positions they do. International conflicts often
occur when one party and its supporters ignore the fears of the other. If a
third party is to succeed in resolving the conflict, he has to address the
fears of each with empathy and imagination. 10
2
The current occupant of the office, Kofi Annan, also has stated
that:
the Secretary-General's office will have the potential to advance the
interests of all states only so long as it does not appear to serve the narrow
interests of any one state or group of states. This is the precarious balance
99. See id. at 131-33. The former Secretary-General notes that Article 99 of the
Charter uses the broader term "matter" rather than "situation" or "dispute," which
therefore "covers all developments which 'could have serious political
implications remediable only by political action'." Id. at 131.
100. Franck & Nolte, supra note 91, at 144.
101. Id. at 172-73, citing VRATISLAV PECHOTA, THE QUIET APPROACH (1972).
102. Perez de Cu~llar, supra note 90, at 133-34. Chester A. Crocker similarly
suggests that the most important reason for a mediator to take the initiative "is to
block the parties' unilateral options and discredit their wishful thinking,"
FREEMAN, supra note 80, at 166 (quoting CHESTER A. CROCKER, HIGH NOON IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA (1992)).
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to which any Secretary-General owes his office, his strength, his
effectiveness and his moral authority.1
0 3
Moreover, if the Secretary-General loses the appearance of
impartiality in one instance, it will compromise his ability to be
trusted in other instances.
The particular method of intervention chosen by someone seeking
to contain an international dispute will probably depend in part on
the nature of the dispute itself. If it involves a legal question,
arbitration or adjudication may be the best approach. If it consists of
"a sensitive political issue that involves factual comparisons with
international practice but few international legal norms," then good
offices or mediation are probably more appropriate.0 4 The choice of
methods and even the degree of maneuverability within the methods
also may depend on the political climate of the time. In 1992,
Security Council asked the newly installed Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali to seek the Libyan government's cooperation
in extraditing the two Lockerbie suspects as well as the Libyan
nationals accused of bombing the French UTA plane. 05 At that time,
the good offices role effectively was confined to mere letter-carrying
on behalf of three Western powers."°6 Libya, thus, had little to lose
by rejecting all demands and overtures.
In contrast, by the fall and winter of 1998-99, six years of
sanctions had token their toll on the Libyan economy, leaving
Secretary-General Annan in a better position to act like a conciliator.
He addressed Libyan fears and bolstered the parties' confidence that
the transfer of the suspects eventually would be arranged to each
side's satisfaction. He was neither negotiating with Libya nor
mediating a negotiation between the United Kingdom, the United
103. Kofi Annan, Walking the International Tightrope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1999, at A 19.
104. Sapiro, Dispute Resolution, supra note 94.
105. See supra note 5.
106. See Franck & Nolte, supra note 91, at 176-80 (criticizing this reduced role).
"[l]n so far as [the Secretary-General's] success in performing any and all good
offices functions is based on his appearance of impartiality, such 'letter-carrier'
assignments are costly .... When he is perceived as a letter carrier doing the
bidding of powerful states, that undermines his credibility as a true mediator." Id.
at 176, 180.
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States, and Libya. A mediator steps into the middle of an existing (or
inchoate but intended) negotiation, whereas a conciliator gives non-
binding advice about how to achieve the objectives and conditions
already laid out. Madeleine Albright and Robin Cook reminded
Annan that there was nothing to negotiate; he had no agency power,
no authority to arrange any "package deals," and was only allowed to
work out the technical details of the exchange. 07
Even without binding powers, the diplomat's exercise of good
offices can play as crucial a function as a more formal role in the
resolution of disputes. In certain instances, good offices are perhaps
more crucial. In the final analysis, it was the Secretary-General's
office, instead of the ICJ or the Security Council, that managed to
bring the two Libyans into the jurisdiction of the Scottish Court.
Moreover, without a rulebook to follow, good offices certainly
require perspicacity, patience, and finesse. In the very period that the
Secretary-General and his deputy, Hans Corell, were engaged in their
Lockerbie conciliation efforts, Annan published some reflections
about his role in world affairs. Without specifically naming names,
he wrote:
I have at times been as skeptical of a leader's true intentions as
anyone .... [b]ut I have persisted, because I must deal with the world not
as I would wish it to be, but as it is. I must confront it with a sense of
reality about how far a leader can be pushed by peaceful means, and how
long it will take to bring peace where a state of war exists.
10 8
C. THE 17 FEBRUARY 1999 "LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING"
The two-part document that Kofi Annan sent to Muammar
Qadhafi on February 17, 1999, will now be analyzed on three levels:
1) the context leading up to its delivery (and later publication) and
the cover letter portion of the document; 2) the substantive annex to
the letter that is titled, "Understanding on the Issues outstanding
107. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. Note that political figures often
use the word "negotiation" in a non-technical sense when they in fact are referring
to mediation or conciliation.
108. Annan, supra note 103; see also SHAWCROSS, supra note 26, at 351-52
(noting that before meeting with Qadhafi, Annan had already in his then two-years
in office been out-maneuvered by dictators Saddam Hussein and Laurent Kabila).
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from the point of view of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;" and 3) the
meaning and effect of the controversial sentence from the annex,
"The two persons will not be used to undermine the Libyan regime."
1. Context and Cover Letter
As already described, by the end of December 1998, the Secretary-
General's staff reportedly had been able to allay all of the Libyan
concerns except for one. The Libyans still were concerned about
where the defendants would be imprisoned if they were convicted.
With the United States and Untied Kingdom adamant that it had to
be Scotland, various measures were employed to convince Libya that
"this was an offer made in good faith and without a hidden agenda,"
recalled U.K. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook.10 9 Kofi Annan already
had traveled to Libya and envoys from other countries with influence
in Libya, including South Africa and Saudi Arabia, tried to persuade
Colonel Qadhafi that it was in his country's best interests to consent
to the arrangement.1 0 The envoys apparently conveyed questions and
concerns in one direction and provided assurances, clarifications, and
answers in the other. "
109. Cook, supra note 16 ("For a while it looked as if negotiations would break
down over the demand by Libya that if convicted the two suspects should not serve
their sentence in Scotland. That was a point of principle on which we could not
compromise."). Note that the term "negotiations" is most likely used here in the
non-technical sense, as Cook himself had already insisted that there was to be no
negotiation.
110. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (listing not only Nelson Mandela
and Saudi Prince Bandar as delegates to Colonel Qadhafi but also President
Mandela's director-general, Jukes Gerwel). In addition, two British
parliamentarians, Lord Steel and Sir Cyril Townsend, met with the Libyan Foreign
Minister, Omar Montassar, in Libya. See also Any Jail Term, supra note 79;
Headlines, Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site (tracking the early developments of the
Lockerbie Bombing Trials) , available at
http://www.Itb.org.uk/headlines.cfm?year= 1999 (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
111. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text (noting that some of the
events described in this section of this article are taken from a letter dated August
22, 2000, from Kofi Annan to Jeremy Greenstock, British Ambassador to the
United Nations, which was released to the public at the same time as the February
17, 1999 letter, on August 25, 2000). The former letter encloses the latter letter and
describes some of the surrounding circumstances. See also Letter from Kofi
Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, to Jeremy Greenstock, British Ambassador to the
United Nations (Aug. 22, 2000) [Attached Letter 2] (on filed with AUILR and
available at page 229 of this article). Hans Corell gave U.S. Ambassador to the
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It is not known if Kofi Annan's original intent was to give Libya
assurances in writing; however, by the middle of February 1999, he
had received information from British authorities that responded to
"necessary clarifications" sought by Libya about "various aspects of
the implementation" of Security Council Resolution 1192 (1998).12
On the afternoon of February 17th, an official letter from Annan to
Colonel Qadhafi was given to Abuzed Dorda, Libya's U.N.
ambassador."3 The five paragraph letter itself was more or less pro
forma, invoking the protocols of title ("Your Excellency") and
courtesy ("I am deeply conscious and appreciative of your own
personal efforts. . ."). It referenced an annexed document (the
Understanding analyzed in detail in the next two sections of this
article) that, according to Annan, was said to set forth agreements
reached in meetings between His Excellency Colonel Qadhafi and
envoys from South Africa and Saudi Arabia.
Significantly, Annan's letter to Qadhafi stated, "After reviewing
this [attached] document, the Governments of the United Kingdom
and the United States have confirmed to me that they share the
understanding reflected therein." However, the letter did not contain
the signature of anyone from either of those governments.
Nevertheless, Annan hinted that the United States and United
Kingdom were ready to use their veto power to back up their "shared
understanding," by indicating that the Secretary-General would be
reporting to the Council about these developments at the time the
Security Council would be reviewing the Libyan sanctions.
Therefore, Annan stated that "it would be most helpful if the
practical arrangements already agreed upon between the Libyan
U.N., Richard Holbrooke, both letters on August 22, 2000. See Letter from Hans
Corell, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, to Richard Holbrooke,
Permanent Representative of the United States of American to the United Nations
(Aug. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Attached Letter 1] (on file with AUILR and available
at page 228 of this article).
112. See Attached Letter 2, supra note 111; see also S.C. Res. 748, ,supra note
5.
113. See Attached Letter 3, supra note 30; UN Writes to Libya with Assurances,
Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site, available at
http://www.ltb.org.uk/headlines.cfm?year=1999 (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
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legal team and my own Legal Counsel could be set in motion before
that date."" I4
Although it is somewhat difficult to discern who the
corresponding parties were, the purpose of the letter was to
memorialize the details of a final agreement already reached by the
relevant governments of Libya, the United Kingdom and the United
States through the assistance of the United Nations, South Africa,
Saudi Arabia, and others. That the letter was intended to "lock in"
Libya is demonstrated by public comments made a week before
February 17, 1999, by Robin Cook's office and nine days after
February 17th made by Kofi Annan himself. A British Foreign
Office spokesperson announced that Libya "has received
comprehensive clarifications" on the initiative and, in reference to
the Libyan suspects, "their rights of consular access and respect for
Islamic culture would be protected, [and] they would not be
manipulated or used in any way to undermine the Libyan
government.""' 5 After reporting to the Security Council that he was
"cautiously optimistic" about Libyan consent, the Secretary-General
said, "In my judgment, we've given all the explanation and
clarifications that have been demanded by the Libyan authorities. We
are waiting for the [Libyan] decision."" 16
It would still take another month for Libya to hedge and to balk
some more, but by March 19, 1999, well before the March 26 "take it
or leave it" deadline imposed by the United States and United
Kingdom, Nelson Mandela announced that the two Libyans would be
handed over in less than two more weeks; and, indeed, they were
transferred on April 5, 1999."17 The Secretary-General's letter,
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Any Jail Term, supra note 79. The announcement was made after a meeting
in London between Cook and South African official Jakes Gerwel. The phrase
"not... undermine the Libyan regime" would be echoed in the Annan letter's
annex. See Attached Letter 3, supra note 30.
116. See U.S., Britain Give Libya More Time to Turn Over Bombing Suspects,
(CNN television broadcast, Feb. 26, 1999).
117. See Mandela Announces Handover Plan, Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site
(noting that some of Qadhafi's last maneuvers included an announcement in late
February that the proper venue for the trial was the International Court of Justice),
available at http://www.ltb.org.uk/displaynews.cfm?nc=40&theyear-1999 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2002); see also Libya "Studying" Proposed Handover, supra note
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however, would not be released publicly"8 for another seventeen
months, causing rumors about "secret deals" and "guarantees of
immunity."'119 U.N. Legal Counsel Hans Corell explained to the
media at the time of release that the annex to the letter "was
elaborated by the governments involved and the only role the
Secretary-General had here was to convey this message... to the
Libyan authorities."' 20 This is supported by the careful use of the
words "clarifications," "explanations" and "understandings" in
written and verbal announcements by U.N. and U.K. officials. Terms
such as "negotiation," "offer" and "counter-offer" are avoided,
except in less formal, non-contemporaneous, verbal contexts. In
other words, the Secretary-General's intervention was not only not a
negotiation, it was barely even a conciliation.
79 (noting the thirty-day deadline imposed on Libya). Of course, the ICJ has no
jurisdiction over individuals or criminal proceedings.
118. See Attached Letter 2, supra note Ill (indicating no initial public release).
Public release occurred on August 25, 2000, but only after the legal team
representing the two Libyan suspects made a request for the letter to the Scottish
Lord Advocate on April 3, 2000, exactly one month before the trial began. This
Defense request was apparently not conveyed to the Secretary-General until July
24, 2000, although he may have been apprised earlier of requests for it by
Lockerbie victim families. See also Goodman, supra note 30. The circumstances of
this highly unusual release are spelled out in the Annan-Greenstock Letter. See
Attached Letter 2.
119. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining the nature and
reaction to the rumors). Lockerbie victim family members had made strenuous
efforts to obtain the letter, writing to the U.S. State Department, the U.K. Foreign
Office, and the Scottish Lord Advocate, and asking Congressman Benjamin
Gilman and Senators Kennedy, Torricelli and Lautenberg to intervene. See also
GERSON & ADLER, supra note 7, at 275-77; COHEN & COHEN, supra note 58, at
267-68; Prosecutor Vows Politics-Free Lockerbie Trial, Reuters, Jan. 6, 2000;
Judge Pressed for Lockerbie Assurance, BBC NEWS, (television broadcast, Jan. 6,
2000); Foreign Office Denies Lockerbie Deal, Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site, Oct.
21, 1999, available at
http://www.ltb.org.uk/displaynews.cfm?nc=l l&theyear-1999 (last visited Oct. 1,
2002). Family members were able to read the letter on the morning of April 25,
2000, on the Lockerbie Trial - Families Project website, which is operated by the
present author. See also infra notes 139-140 (discussing the families and the letter).
120. Goodman, supra note 30. The Annan-Greenstock Letter also refers to the
Secretary-General's role in the matter as "limited to providing assistance with the
transfer arrangements of the two accused to the Scottish court and to nominating
international observers." Attached Letter 2, supra note 111.
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2. The Letter's Annex
The annex to Annan's letter contains the heading, "Understanding
on the Issues outstanding from the point of view of the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya." This is somewhat ambiguous. Does "issues
outstanding" mean "issues not yet resolved" or is it an inadvertent
reversal of "outstanding issues," as in "prominent" or "important
issues?" The cover letter had described an "understanding reached on
outstanding issues," implying that they already had been resolved.
The ambiguity may not matter, as these issues would certainly be
important to Libya, whether or not they were still unresolved.
Nevertheless, one would have expected a more balanced heading
such as "Understanding between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the
United Kingdom, and the United States on the Remaining Issues" if,
as the cover letter attests, the latter two governments "share the
understanding reflected therein."
The annex contained seven paragraphs, the substance of which can
be summarized as follows: 1) transfer from Libya to Netherlands for
trial; 2) consequences if convicted or not convicted; 3) intentions and
non-intentions; 4) Scottish prison facility with international
designation; 5) rights and conditions of imprisonment; 6) right to
make representations to the United Kingdom; and 7) suspension of
Security Council sanctions if transferred. Each of these paragraphs,
quoted in full below, is followed by brief comments.'
2'
As provided for in Security Council resolution 1192 (1998) the two
persons concerned will be transferred from Libya to the Netherlands and
tried under Scottish law before a Scottish court sitting in the
Netherlands. 122
This paragraph described the basic contours of the "extradition by
analogy" agreement that had been reached in principle months
earlier, on August 27, 1999.123
121. Most comments on the controversial third paragraph will be presented in
the next sub-section of this article.
122. Attached Letter 3, supra note 30.




If found guilty, after any necessary appeals process, they will serve their
prison sentence in Scotland. If the two are not convicted, they will be free
to return to Libya unimpeded. 124
This is a statement of the most recent addition to the agreement, as
of mid-February 1999, concerning where the terms of imprisonment
would be served if the two were convicted; this was a condition of
which the United States and United Kingdom were unwilling to
compromise. 21 With the exception of the seventh paragraph, every
subsequent sentence and paragraph in the Understanding was, in
essence, an elaboration on this new point. This second paragraph
itself contained an assurance that was reported to have worried
Qadhafi. As in any normal Scottish trial, acquitted defendants are
free to go. They will not, for instance, be "kidnapped" and taken to
the United States. 1
26
There is no intention to interview them, or to allow them to be
interviewed, about any issue not related to the trial. There will be no
deviation from Scottish law which provides that the two persons have the
right to refuse to see any police or intelligence officers. The two persons
will not be used to undermine the Libyan regime. 1
27
As explained more fully in the next section of this article, this
paragraph followed from the previous one. It set out assurances as to
their treatment in Scottish prison if the two men were convicted.
More precisely, it described what would not happen to them. The
reference to Scottish law implied that they would be treated the same
as any other Scottish prisoners, i.e. their right to remain silent as to
any crime other than the one they were convicted of would be
respected. 
28
124. Attached Letter 3, supra note 30.
125. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting the United Kingdom and
United States' unwillingness to compromise).
126. See supra note 71-73 and accompanying text (detailing Scottish law and
accommodations with respect to the Libyan suspects).
127. Attached Letter 3, supra note 30.
128. The indictment of Megrahi and Fhimah originally contained three
charges-conspiracy to murder, murder, and violation of sections 2(1) and 5 of the
Airline Security Act of 1982. See Clare Connelly, The Charges and the Indictment,
in LOCKERBIE HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 6-10.
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The prisoners would be held in a distinct portion of a Scottish prison to
provide maximum security. All necessary measures will be taken to
ensure the safety and well-being of the two persons, if convicted. This
facility will be given a special international designation, and special
arrangements will be introduced to provide for a role for the United
Nations in monitoring the treatment of the two persons concerned. These
arrangements, which will be subject to discussions with the United
Nations, will be regularly reviewed by the British Government to ensure
that they worked effectively arid satisfied the legitimate concerns of all
parties. 129
This paragraph added some of the recent accommodations that the
United Kingdom reportedly had agreed to in the early weeks of 1999
in order to persuade Libya to accept the non-negotiable condition of
imprisonment in Scotland. 30 Note, however, that even though these
accommodations brought the United Nations back into the picture,
the United Kingdom retained the right to oversee what the United
Nations would be doing. This was an implicit reminder that even
though the Secretary-General was the author of this document, was
mainly was serving here as a scribe and not as the administrative
head of an organization desiring to carve out a special role for itself.
The two prisoners would have unfettered access to legal and diplomatic
representatives. An official Libyan presence in Scotland for that purpose
will be allowed. Pursuant to the conditions of imprisonment set out in the
relevant Scottish law, religious, health and dietary requirements of the
two prisoners would be fully met. Visits by clerics and the supply of
religious books would be arranged. 131
This paragraph continued elaborating on the U.K.'s newly agreed
to accommodations. Like the previous reference to Scottish law, it
indicated that the two Libyans would otherwise be afforded the same
rights given to all Scottish prisoners.'32
129. Attached Letter 3, supra note 30.
130. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (describing the announcement
made after a meeting in London).
131. Attached Letter 3, supra note 30.
132. See Michael Binyon, Libya's Rehabilitation Starts on the Beaches,
LONDON TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999 (stating that the government recently permitted
Libya to establish a consulate in Scotland); see also Marcello Mega, Lockerbie
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The two prisoners or their representatives will have the right to make
representations to the authorities of the United Kingdom if they consider
that some aspect of their place of imprisonment was contrary to
humanitarian concerns. Any such representation would be very carefully
considered by the United Kingdom authorities. 1
33
This too reflected the recent accommodations, with the added
assurance that the United Kingdom was taking and would continue to
take this whole matter quite seriously. Moreover, the prisoners would
be allowed to make their own representations if they desired, without
having to rely on the United Nations and Libyan observers who also
were accessible. In that sense too, it was implied, the Libyans would
be afforded the same rights as other Scottish prisoners.
With reference to the measures set forth in Security Council resolutions
748 (1992) and 883 (1993), these measures shall be suspended
immediately if the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the two
persons concerned have arrived in the Netherlands for the purpose of trial
before the Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. These measures could
only be reimposed by a new decision of the Council taken by an
affirmative vote of nine Members of the Council, including the
concurring votes of all the Permanent Members. 134
Unlike paragraphs one through six, this one addressed the
concerns of Libya as a whole rather than those of the two suspects. It
was the impact of six years of sanctions that brought Libya to the
table, "'35 so it was not unexpected that Qadhafi would therefore try to
bargain for their termination if he agreed to surrender the two men.
Note, however, that Libya was given suspension, rather than
termination, of the international sanctions, along with the assurance
that they would not be re-imposed in some irregular fashion (such as
by unilateral or bilateral pressure by the United States or United
Kingdom).
Bomber to Get Services of Interpreter, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Apr. 21, 2002
(detailing that the consulate in Scotland will be opened to meet Megrahi's needs).
133. Attached Letter 3, supra note 30.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (stating that the U.N. sanctions
had cost Libya $25 million); see also infra notes 171-174 and accompanying text
(discussing the matter of the sanctions' suspension).
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Before examining more closely the meaning and effect of
paragraph three, it is already apparent that the major purpose of the
annexed Understanding was to address what would occur if the two
suspects were convicted and sentenced to prison terms in Scotland.
The next section will demonstrate further that Kofi Annan's letter
was in no way intended to nor could it interfere with further criminal
investigations and prosecutions relating to the Lockerbie bombing.
3. The "Not Undermine" Sentence
"The two persons will not be used to undermine the Libyan
regime." Considered in isolation, it might be reasonable to believe
that this sentence constitutes a guarantee that after the trial of the two
suspects, no additional leads or evidence will be followed that might
implicate any other members of the Libyan government. However,
there are at least two reasons why this would be an erroneous
interpretation. The first explanation involves reading the sentence in
its full context within the paragraph and the object and purpose of the
entire Understanding supplemented by contemporaneous and
subsequent commentaries by related parties.'36 Also, it is useful to
appreciate why Muammar Qadhafi, or even the two suspects
themselves, would have asked for such an assurance. The second
explanation involves the legal status (or lack thereof) of the entire
Understanding, in relation to the independent authority of Scottish
law enforcement officials.
The clause in question is clearly part of a paragraph pertaining to
the rights of the two Libyans, if imprisoned in Scotland, to refuse to
speak with anyone such as prison officials, police, prosecutors, other
Scottish, British or American officials, or even journalists against
their will. This is reinforced by the broader context of the entire
Understanding: paragraph three is one of five paragraphs, out of a
total of seven, that address post-conviction rights. The textual
meaning is reinforced further by reference to the temporal context:
the Understanding memorializes a series of assurances recently given
by the United Kingdom after almost six months of efforts to reach an
agreement. As already quoted, the U.K. Foreign Office had
136. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 27, arts. 30-31
(modeling the contextual interpretation of the Understanding, while not a treaty
itself, on the treaty interpretation rules contained in the Vienna Convention).
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announced one week before the Annan letter and Annex had been
sent to Qadhafi that Libya had been assured that the accused would
not be "manipulated or used in any way."' 37 As another British
official explained at the time the two documents were released to the
public, paragraph three draws an implicit distinction between using
the two Libyan prisoners with the specific aim of undermining
Qadhafi's regime, and following the evidence in the case wherever it
might lead.138
Knowing that many of the Lockerbie victim families were worried
about the implications of the "not undermine" sentence, the U.S.
State Department and U.K. Foreign Office prepared a 650 word
document called "Questions and Answers on the Release of the UN
Secretary General's February 17, 1999, Letter and Annex" ("Q. and
A."); this paper accompanied the documents in the package given to
the families on August 25, 2000.139 The Q. and A. confirms that the
Annex covers clarifications of the criminal justice system in Scotland
and the rights and safeguards that are afforded to the accused in a
Scottish criminal trial.'40 Specifically addressing the "not undermine"
language, the Q. and A. explains:
137. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting the announcement was
made after the British government met with South African official Jakes Gerwel).
138. See Goodman, supra note 30; see also No Deal Pledge Over Lockerbie,
BBC NEWS, Jan. 6, 2000 (noting that months before it was released publicly,
U.N. spokesman Fred Eckhard also said that there was nothing in the letter that
would constrain the judges, and that the trial would "go in whatever direction the
evidence takes it").
139. See Questions and Answers on the Release of the UN Secretary-General's
February 17, 1999 Letter and Annex to Libyan Leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi
Prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, and the U.S.
Department of State, Aug. 25, 2000 [hereinafter Attachment 4] (on file with
AUILR and available at page 234 of this article). The entire package was posted
that morning, simultaneously with the public release of the Annan letter, Annex,
and related letters, on the password-protected website created for the families and
operated by the present author.
140. The Q. and A. goes on to describe why the United States and United
Kingdom were unable to disclose the letter when the American families first asked
the State Department about it in 1999. Explaining that only the U.N. Secretary-
General can release his own correspondence and that communications between
him and leaders of member states are sensitive and normally confidential, the Q.
and A. notes that once the Lord Advocate and the Defense team announced that
they would prefer the letter and annex to be released, the two governments
2002]
204 AM. U. INT'LL. REV. [18:163
Q - Is the promise that the two suspects would not be used to undermine
the Libyan regime an assurance that the prosecution will not target higher-
ranking Libyan officials?
A - No, the phrase in question has to be read in context - it is part of a
paragraph that clarifies the Libyan suspects' right to refuse to see anyone.
This phrase spells out this right in response to Libyan concern that the
U.S. and U.K. intended to somehow coerce the two suspects in an effort
to undermine the Libyan regime. The right to remain silent is afforded to
all suspects tried under Scottish domestic law. U.S. law affords the same
protections.
- The phrase in question also makes clear that this trial is an
independent, legitimate trial of the two accused. The Scottish judicial
process cannot be pressured by governments for political purposes. That
would be absolutely contrary to the British constitution. The trial
underway in the Netherlands is not a show trial intended to "undermine"
the Libyan regime.
- The statement does not limit in any way the prosecutors' freedom to
follow the evidence wherever it leads.
- As Lord Advocate Colin Boyd stated, the Secretary General's letter
does not inhibit him in any way from the prosecution of this crime. He
has publicly made clear that he considers it his duty to follow any
evidence that comes to light.
Q - If the two suspects decided to cooperate with the prosecution and
provide evidence against higher-ranking Libyan officials, would the
phrase in question prevent the prosecutors from indicting such officials,
on the grounds that this would "undermine" the Libyan regime?
A - No, the statement in question does not in any way limit the
prosecution's ability to follow the evidence wherever it leads.
approached the Secretary-General and asked him to consider "these exceptional
circumstances, and he agreed." See Attachment 4, supra note 139.
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Former Secretary-General Perez de Cu~llar has written that "if a
third party is to succeed in resolving [an interstate] conflict, he has to
address the fears of each [state] with empathy and imagination."'' 1
What Libyan fears might Kofi Annan have been addressing in his
"not undermine" sentence? A few possibilities come to mind. For
instance, the prisoners might be pressured into turning state's
evidence against a higher official in the Libyan Intelligence Services
or government who was connected with the bombing. Or they would
be coerced into giving information (whether true or not) about some
other aspect of the Libyan regime in order to protect their rights or
status in prison. Perhaps that they might be exploited for anti-Libyan
propaganda purposes once they arrive in Scotland. Or even if
acquitted, they might be held as bargaining chips to extract ransom-
like concessions from Libya.
It should not come as a surprise that these would be among
Colonel Qadhafi's concerns. After all, in Libyan prisons, detainees
frequently are subjected to indefinite incommunicado detention,
forced confessions, and other unlawful treatment. In August 1999,
the 30th anniversary of the revolution that brought Qadhafi into
power, Amnesty International [AI] announced:
After three decades of gross human rights violations, even the most basic
safeguards have yet to be put in place.... [AI] remains deeply concerned
about the detention of prisoners of conscience and hundreds of political
prisoners.... [AI] continues to receive reports of torture, deaths in
custody and incidents of houses being demolished as a collective
punishment on political grounds. The organization has recently written to
the Libyan authorities asking for clarification of the circumstances
surrounding the deaths in custody of two political prisoners. 1
42
141. Prez de Cu~llar, supra note 90, at 134.
142. See Libya: 30 Years On - Time for Action, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
NEWS SERVICE, Al INDEX MDE 19/06/99 (Aug. 31, 1999) (identifying two
prisoners as Mohammad Ali Bakoush and Al-Wafi Nbiyya, a former ambassador),
available at
http://library.amnesty.it/isdocs/aidoc-everything.nsf/Index/MDE 190061999 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2002); see also Reporters Sans Frontiers, Libya: 2000 Annual
Report (describing the plight of a Libyan journalist, Abdullah Ali al-Sanssi al-
Darrat, who has been detained without being charged or tried since 1973, longer
than any other journalist anywhere in the world), available at
http://www.rsf.fr/uk/rap2000/mo/libya.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
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In the two-year period leading up to the surrender of the Lockerbie
suspects, Al reported about Libya that "torture is routinely applied to
detainees during interrogation to extract confessions,"'43 that "scores
of political detainees have been held without charge or trial, some for
at least 15 years," 144 and that, among other cases, three members of
one family were serving life in prison following a retrial on charges
for which they had previously been acquitted. 45 In June and July
1998, over one hundred Libyan doctors, engineers, students and
businessmen were arrested under a 1972 "Incrimination of Party
Activism" law that carried an automatic death sentence for anyone
who calls for the establishment of any group that is "based on a
political concept opposed in its aims or means to the principles of the
September [1969] revolution. "146
143. See Libya: No Chance for Dissenting Voices, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
NEWS SERVICE, Al INDEX MDE 19/008/1998 (July 2, 1998) (detailing methods of
Libyan torture that include beatings on the soles of the feet, hanging by the wrists
from a ceiling or high window, electric shocks, burning with cigarettes and attacks
by aggressive dogs), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/MDE190081998?Open Document&of=COUN
TRIES%SCLIBYA (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). Forms of psychological torture and
ill-treatment include death threats and threats of abuse against the prisoner's
family, particularly female relatives. Id. See also Libya: Gross Human Rights
Violations Amid Secrecy and Isolation, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Al INDEX
MDE 19/008/197 (June 25, 1997) (detailing Libya's horrific human rights abuses),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/197/SUM/51900897.htm (last
visited Sept. 18, 2002).
144. Libya. From Acquittal to Life Imprisonment, in State Injustice: Unfair
Trials in the Middle East & North Africa - Appeals Cases, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, Al INDEX MDE 01/003/1998 (Jan. 3, 1998) available at
http://www.amnesty.org/ai/nsf/print/MDE010031998?OpenDocument (last visited
Oct. 1, 2002).
145. See SIJILL: International Condemnation of the Gaddafi Regime, Political
Prisoners and Detainees in Libya (identifying 45 prisoners by name), available at
http://members.tripod.com/sijill/prison (last visited Sept. 9 2002). Reports by
country specific organizations about Libyan political prisoners include the al-
Fitouri family who were among scores of persons arrested on suspicion of
attempting to overthrow the government and propagating subversive ideas. Id.; see
also The Libyan Union for Human Rights Defenders, Annual Report (outlining
atrocities and human rights abuses by the Libyan government), available at
http://www.libyahumanrights.com (last visited Sept. 9 2002).
146. See Law No. 71 of 1972(2), arts. 2-3, noted in Human Rights Solidarity,
Press Release: Mass Trial of 98 Prisoners of Conscience will be Held in Tripoli
(May 30, 2001) (punishing with death any form of group activity based on political
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A second basis for supporting the non-controversial interpretation
of the "not undermine" sentence lies in the legal status of the
Understanding. Simply put, it has none. The Secretary-General has
no authority to bind U.N. Member States; only the Security Council
can do so as long as it has identified a threat to international peace
and security and it is operating pursuant to its Chapter VII powers.
41
Moreover, in this particular instance, the Secretary-General was
careful to stress that he was doing no more than working out the
technical transportation details and serving as a conduit of messages.
Even if the Understanding purported to be more than it is (such as
an implied promise on the part of the U.K. Foreign Office or the U.S.
State Department), it would not force the hand of Scottish law
enforcement officials. Lord Advocate Andrew Hardie, the chief law
enforcement officer of Scotland at the time, issued a statement in
January 2000 reassuring the Lockerbie victim families:
I have, on a number of occasions, both in the United Kingdom and
the United States, given my personal reassurance to the relatives of
the Lockerbie victims that I have not seen any document, nor would I
have been party to any document, that would inhibit me in the
exercise of my duties in relation to the prosecution and investigation
of crime in Scotland, in particular in relation to the forthcoming trial
at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands.
The purpose of this trial is to determine the guilt or innocence of the
two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing. So far as the
ideology), available at http://www.libyanet.com/050/nwsc.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2002); see also U.S. Dept. of State, Libya, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (Feb. 25, 2000) (detailing the arrest of a group of defendants arrested in a
wave of mass arrests that took place in major cities in Libya in June 1998),
available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanjrights/ I 999_hrp-jeport/libya.html (last
visited Oct. 1, 2002).
147. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42, quoted in Office of the Spokesman for the
Secretary-General, Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
(detailing information on Security Council sanctions), available at
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sanction.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
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publication of any letter issued by the UN Secretary-General is
concerned, that is a matter entirely for the UN.' 48
The Lord Advocate's office is characterized by a 500 year-old
tradition of independence that is now even more entrenched since
Scottish devolution went into effect in 1998.141 Independence is a
double-edged sword; the Lord Advocate is autonomous from
political pressure to exploit or abuse prisoners as well as from
outside pressure to refrain from following investigatory leads. From
a defendants' rights perspective, the Lockerbie bombers could not
have "selected" a better country over which to have exploded Pan
Am 103.151 Colonel Qadhafi, on the other hand, may feel differently.
III. ASSESSING THE ARRANGEMENT
Deciding whether to go ahead with the Lockerbie criminal trial
and, therefore, the "extradition by analogy" agreement, was
elementary for the Lord Advocate:
148. See "No Deal" Pledge Over Lockerbie, supra note 138 (disavowing any
potential conflict that would prevent the chief law enforcement officer of Scotland
from zealously pursuing the terrorists); see also Symposium, supra note 17, at 17
(confirming that the Lord Advocate was adamant and "that whatever model was
devised he could not be handicapped in his prosecution of the case").
149. See Stephen Young, Devolution in the United Kingdom: A Revolution in
Online Legal Research (June 1, 2001) ("Since 1998 the constitutional structure of
the United Kingdom has undergone dramatic changes. Through the process of
devolution certain powers formally vested in the U.K. Parliament have been
transferred to new legislative bodies located in Scotland, Northern Ireland and
Wales."), available at http://www.llrx.com/features/devolution.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2002); see also The Scotland Act 1998, United Kingdom Statute 1998, ch.
46, pt. II, sec. 48(5) (1999) ("Any decision of the Lord Advocate in his capacity as
head of the systems of criminal prosecution and investigation of deaths in Scotland
shall continue to be taken by him independently of any other person."); Hardie,
supra note 17 (explaining the office of the Lord Advocate).
150. See Marcello Mega, Error that Sealed the Fate of Lockerbie, SCOTLAND ON
SUNDAY (Mar. 17, 2002) (explaining that this statement is meant ironically as the
terrorists probably intended the bomb to explode while the place was over the
Atlantic so that evidence could not be found), available at
http://www.scotlandonsunday.com/index.cfm?id=295572002 (last visited Oct. 1,
2002). Scottish investigators believe that whoever set the bomb's timer probably
forgot to adjust for the one-hour time difference between Malta and London. Jd.
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Faced with a choice of bringing to trial suspects of the worst mass murder
in Scottish legal history or closing the book and giving up was no choice
at all .... [T]he alternative of a Scottish trial in a third country or no trial
at all-I had no doubt as to where the public interest lay. 151
The more demanding task is to assess, from the post-trial and post-
appeal perspective, whether the special arrangements made for the
Lockerbie trial, including the physical and juridical creation of a
special court and prison facility in the Netherlands and the many
person-hours invested in arranging the "extradition by analogy,"
should be considered purely a one-time exceptional series of
measures, or whether they can serve as a template on which other
contentious transnational prosecutions might be based. 52 This is an
appraisal that involves issues of both practicality and legitimacy.
These are not necessarily mutually exclusive concepts, though this
151. See Hardie, supra note 17; see also Anglo-US Agreement, supra note 65
(quoting Hardie as stating, "I am satisfied that without an initiative of this sort,
there is no prospect of these men being tried before a Scottish court"). But Hardie
also noted that, "what we were contemplating would be controversial and could be
depicted as a sell-out to Libya or alleged terrorists." Id. Indeed, some of the
Lockerbie victim families opposed the entire idea of a neutral country trial on
grounds similar to these. See e.g. Rosemary Wolfe, Gadhafi's Deal is No Deal at
All, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1997; COHEN & COHEN, supra note 58, at 249-273
(noting that on the day that the two suspects arrived in Netherlands, Susan Cohen
was quoted as saying that Qadhafi will see sanctions lifted and not be held
accountable). She continued, "[t]his is sickening to see this passed off as justice."
Id. See also Mixed Emotions for Many Families of Pan Am 103 Victims, CNN, Apr.
5, 1999, available at http://www.cnn.com/US/9904/05/us.lockerbie.families/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2002). Some non-American family members criticized the trial
after it was over, under the belief that Libya was not actually behind the bombing.
See Relative's Doubts Over Lockerbie Case, BBC NEWS, Oct. 15, 2001 available at
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/1600588.stm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002);
Tim Reid, Lockerbie Families Cast Doubt on the Conviction, TIMES (LONDON),
Feb. 2, 2001; Reevel Alderson, Lockerbie: A Long Search for the Truth, the
Conviction, BBC NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002, available at
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/l871049.stm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
152. Cf Peter Ford, Lockerbie Success as New Model, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 1, 2001 (analyzing the success of the Lockerbie trial model). This
analysis will assess only the pre-trial arrangements themselves. Whether the
defendants were given a fair trial, or whether the one guilty and one not guilty
verdict were the proper result, is beyond the scope of this article. Similarly, this is
not a judgment about whether the trial was "worthwhile," as that is a subjective
matter that each participant and observer must answer for herself, and may not
even be possible to judge for many more
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article will for utility purposes discuss each under separate headings.
In other words, will or should a trial along the same lines ever be
undertaken again?
This analysis assumes that the very compromise at the heart of the
whole arrangement, the decision to hold a Scottish trial in the
Netherlands instead of in Scotland, was an indispensable incentive
for Qadhafi, and therefore an absolute prerequisite for holding a trial
at all, as the Lord Advocate's "clear choice" declaration suggests. It
also assumes that in the future there will be transnational crimes that
are not within the jurisdiction of the permanent International
Criminal Court ("ICC") and for which there is no pre-existing
extradition treaty between the states where the crime occurred and
where the suspects reside. Certainly, terrorist cases likely fall into
this situation, as the ICC's jurisdiction currently is limited to a very
narrow spectrum of war-related crimes.'53 This is important because
terrorists often take refuge in countries that do not engage in mutual
criminal assistance with likely target states. 54 Other prototypical
transnational crimes such as trafficking in narcotics, firearms, or
women and children; money-laundering; theft of intellectual and
cultural property; or bribery of public officials, are also likely
prospects for similar reasons.'55 Finally, this analysis assumes that
153. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), arts. 5-8 (defining genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes very carefully, and tailoring them to cover very specific
situations). For a terrorist act to constitute genocide, the prosecution must prove
the defendant's "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such." Id. art. 6. To constitute a crime against humanity, the
attack must be "part of a widespread or systematic... course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of acts... against any civilian population, pursuant to or
in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack." Id. art.
7(1), 7(2)(a). War crimes are "committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of
a large-scale commission of such crimes" within the context of an international or
internal armed conflict. Id. art. 8(1). The burden of proof of any of these three
crimes in cases of terrorism, when evidence of planning and specific intent is likely
to be concealed, would be enormous. Cf Steven W. Krohn, Comment, The United
States and the World Need an International Criminal Court as an Ally in the War
Against Terrorism, 8 IND. INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 159 (1997).
154. See United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network, supra note 37
(pointing out that as of 1996, states such as Iraq, The Philippines and Uganda each
had entered into extradition treaties with only two other states).
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the options under consideration are consistent with international law;
state-sponsored, transborder abduction of the defendant, for instance,
is excluded.156
A. PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
Although the Lord Advocate considered it a "no choice at all"
decision, certain economic, legal, and political factors would
naturally be taken into account by any national law enforcement
officials who may be considering the "Lockerbie model" of a third-
country trial in a future case. Given the renown and notorious long-
standing impasse over the Lockerbie indictments, money may have
been "no object" in the search for a solution, but officials in future
cases may not be able to ignore financial considerations. The cost of
the Lockerbie trial and appeal has been estimated to be an
extraordinary $106 million (074.5m), including $16 million (f£ 1.2m)
in capital outlays for converting the NATO base into the Camp Zeist
court and prison complex, and over $62 million (£44m) in operating
costs, some of which would not have been incurred had the trial been
held in Scotland, 5 7 making it the most expensive trial in British
155. See U.S. Department of Justice, International Crime Control Strategy (May
1998) (outlining other crimes that would need to fall under the scope of the ICC's
jurisdiction), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/press/iccindex.pdf (last
visited Sept. 9, 2002).
156. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, International Kidnapping: State-Sponsored
Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
746 (1992) (criticizing the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, for failing to recognize state-sponsored abduction as violating customary
law and sovereignty); Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign
Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939 (1993); Andrew L.
Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered: The Jurisdictional Nihilism of the Supreme
Court's Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1209 (1994);
Douglas J. Sylvester, Comment: Customary International Law, Forcible
Abductions, and America's Return to the "Savage State, " 42 BUFF. L. REV. 555
(1994). But see U.S. Attorney's Manual, supra note 36, at 9-15.610 (noting the
position of the U.S. Department of Justice).
157. See Jim McBeth, Today, We Give Our Decision, SCOTSMAN, Mar. 15, 2002;
see also Lockerbie Trial in Statistics, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Feb. 1, 2001
(involving special expenses including transportation to and from Scotland and
room and board for the 200 police and prison service employees who guarded
Camp Zeist). Presumably, if the trial had been in Scotland, an existing facility
could have been used, through technological upgrades for the courthouse and
security enhancements for the jail may have been needed. Id. The $106 million
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history. 58 Although the Camp Zeist facility has been returned to the
Dutch government, one hopes it will remain intact so it can be used
for other international or transnational cases. 59
The possibility of restrictions on the national court's ancillary
powers when it is operating outside of its normal jurisdiction is
another factor to be considered by national law enforcement officials.
Under the 1999 bilateral treaty that facilitated the creation of the
Scottish Court in the Netherlands, the Court was granted the power
to hold persons in contempt and to detain witnesses who were at risk
of absconding or committing an offense within the premises of Camp
Zeist. 60 The special U.K. legislation that created the Court also
figure does not include the estimated $426 million (£300m) in preparing and
prosecuting the case, most of which would have been incurred in a Scotland-based
trial. Id. See generally Lockerbie Question that Remains Unanswered, SCOTSMAN,
Mar. 15, 2002 (citing the impossibility of even estimating the additional costs
incurred by the United Nations and other governments in conciliating the
extradition impasse). If it had been a jury trial, transportation, room and board in
Holland for a larger number of triers of fact would have been required, though that
still may have been less than the costs associated with four trial judges (three plus
and alternative) instead of one and five appellate judges instead of three. Id.
158. See Andrew Buncombe & Kim Sengupta, Verdict Does Little to End
Bitterness and Suspicion, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 15, 2002.
159. See Uncertain Future for Camp Zeist, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2002)
(acknowledging that although the location of the Camp Zeist facility is not literally
in the Hague, it would still be ideal for the International Criminal Court.); see also
Lockerbie Trial Venue Handed Back, BBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2002).
160. See Neth-U.K. Treaty, supra note 25, art. 3(3) ("The Government permits
the detention of the accused for the purposes of the trial, and, in the event of
conviction, pending their transfer to the United Kingdom, within the premises of
the Scottish Court in accordance with Scots law and practice.")
The enforcement of all other sanctions involving the deprivation of liberty of
persons within those premises is not permitted, except in so far as the Scottish
Court orders: (a) the temporary detention of witnesses transferred in custody
to the premises of the Scottish Court; (b) the temporary detention of witnesses
in the course of their evidence; (c) the temporary detention of persons who
may have committed offences within the premises of the Scottish Court,
including contempt of court; and (d) the imprisonment of persons found guilty
summarily of contempt of court.
Id. See also Order in Council, supra note 25, art. 13 ("The High Court of Judiciary
shall have jurisdiction in relation to any contempt of court or other offence
committed in the course of, or in relation to, proceedings being conducted by
virtue of this Order, whether at the premises of the court or elsewhere in the
Netherlands."); Symposium, supra note 17, at 18 ("It was, however, a tribute to the
legal and practical arrangements put in place by all agencies that his transfer
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authorized it to issue warrants for the arrest of any witnesses in the
United Kingdom who would not voluntarily appear at the court.161
However, for witnesses "outwith the United Kingdom," the Court
only had the power to cite them to appear and to serve them with
overseas process. 16 2 If they refused to appear voluntarily, the Court,
had no power to order them into custody. This disability may in fact
have hindered the prosecution of the second Lockerbie defendant. 16 3
The national officials would also need to take political
considerations into account, perhaps weighing public perception of
the government's commitment to the particular law enforcement
issue against perceptions that might arise from the effort to negotiate
and to undertake an overseas trial. As one observer commented on
the Lockerbie arrangement, "Politically, acceptance of the proposal
might appear to some to give to those accused of terrorism a choice
as to where and how they should be tried. It might also be seen as
acknowledgement that the accused would not get a fair trial in
Scotland."' 64 Similarly, it might have been perceived as an admission
(twice) to and from the Court was carried out efficiently and without fuss, although
the specific arrangement was unprecedented"); Aust, supra note 25, at 288-89
(explaining that other than the two accused, the Court only needed to detain one
additional person, the witness Abu Talb, who was serving a life sentence in
Sweden for terrorist bombings in Denmark).
161. See Order in Council, supra note 25, art. 12(2) ("Any warrant for the arrest
of a witness shall be authority for him to be transferred, under arrangements made
in that regard by the Secretary of State, to the premises of the court.").
162. See id. art. 12(3) ("It shall be competent for witnesses who are outwith the
United Kingdom to be cited to appear before the High Court of Judiciary sitting in
the Netherlands in the same way as if the court had been sitting in Scotland and,
accordingly, subsection (l)(b) of section 2 of the Criminal Justice (International
Co-operation) Act 1990 ... shall have effect as if the reference to a court in the
United Kingdom included the High Court of Judiciary sitting, by virtue of this
Order, in the Netherlands.").
163. See Witnesses Pull Out of Lockerbie Trial, BBC NEwS, July 12, 2000,
(reporting that in the Lockerbie trial, some witnesses who worked at Luqa airport
in Malta reportedly refused to come to the Netherlands to testify after lengthy
negotiations), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/830250.stm. These
witnesses may have offered testimony implicating the acquitted defendant, Lamen
Fhimah, who was the Libyan Airlines station manager at Luqa.
164. See Aust, supra note 25, at 283 (noting that Libyan sanctions were being
increasingly flouted and the resolve of other Security Council members to maintain
them appeared to be sagging); see also id. (expressing an opinion that wild
accusations were flying about an official cover-up of the evidence of who was
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that Scottish prisons are inadequate if the United Kingdom had
conceded to Libya's demand that prison sentences be served in Libya
or a third country.165 Foreign policy, national security, trade policy,
and other such considerations inevitably will be factored into any
transnational prosecution. 6 6 Each of these kinds of political factors
will be unique to each case.
Any country that is asked, in the absence of an extradition treaty,
to surrender voluntarily its nationals or other suspects within its
territory will have to weigh its own legal, political, and possibly
economic factors to include the cost of continued sanctions, if any
are in place. Agreeing to surrender in one case risks the potential
creation of an undesirable legal precedent, both domestically and
internationally. On the other hand, a state or government that is
undergoing a transition from one kind of regime to another may want
to demonstrate its new-found commitment to joining the
"international rule of law community" and its willingness to accept
any outcome of a trial to which it was not legally obligated to
consent. Such "self-rehabilitation" may have been one of Qadhafi's
motives in agreeing to turn over the Lockerbie suspects.167 However,
really behind the Pan AM 103 bombing, and it was thought that only a trial could
put them to rest).
165. The existence of an internationally operated prison might have shortened the
protracted discussions leading to the transfer of the two Libyans to Camp Zeist. To
date, no such international prison exists. See Gabrielle McDonald, Practice
Direction on the Procedure for the International Tribunal's'Designation of the
State in Which a Convicted person is to Serve His/Her Sentence of Imprisonment,
July 9, 1998 (declaring that the President of the International Tribunal determines
the State where the accused will serve his imprisonment sentence), at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/detention/IT137.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
166. See U.S. Attorney's Manual, supra note 36, at 9-15.700 (4) (stating that in
the United States, the Department of State makes the final determination as to
whether to surrender a fugitive to a requesting state, even after a court has
determined in a hearing under 18 U.S.C. 3184 that he is extraditable); see also id.,
art. 9-15.100 (determining that generally in the United States extradition may be
granted in accordance with a treaty, but some other countries can grant extradition
without a treaty). Law of extradition varies from country to country and is subject
to foreign policy considerations. Id.
167. See Sarah El Deeb, Gadhafi Becoming More Pragmatic, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 4, 2001 (stating that according to Cambridge University's Saad
Djabbar, "Libya is no longer on the side of movements challenging existing
regimes"), available at http://www.lafa.org/News-Auguat2001.htm (last visited
Sept. 7, 2002). Continuing, Djabbar, stated, "It's more on the side of the status
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skeptical observers may judge the Colonel's post-conviction ranting
and raving about the judges needing to "commit suicide" as evidence
of contrary schemes. 68 On the other hand, might the conviction and
rejected appeal of the one Lockerbie defendants now deter other
would-be Qadhafis from following his lead (particularly if the
Colonel continues to insist that the trial was "political")? At any rate,
they have less reason to worry, now that the ICJ has ruled that it is a
violation of customary international law for a national court to fail to
respect the immunity from criminal prosecution, even for crimes
against humanity, of another country's incumbent Minister of
Foreign Affairs.'69
quo." Id. See also New Image, 60 MINUTES II, supra note 8 (stating that Qaddafi
intends to "make peace with the West" and that imposed sanctions have cost Libya
more than $30 billion); Takeyh, supra note 8, at 62 (recommending that the United
States utilize economic, political, and diplomatic tools to reintegrate Libya in the
international community).
168. See Gerson & Adler, supra note 7, at 277 ("Was Kaddafi backed into a
corner by his own rhetoric, compounded by economic desperation? Or did he just
accept what he had wanted all along, secure in the belief that after all these years
the evidence had grown stale, and the prosecution would never be able to prove its
case under the exacting standards of Anglo-Saxon justice?"). See supra notes 2-4
and accompanying text (noting the comments of Qadhafi relating to the judges
have the choice between committing suicide, resigning, or admitting the truth).
Perhaps Qadhafi's rants and raves were just public posturing for an at-home
constituency that he had not been honest with.
169. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Rep. of the Congo v.
BeIg.) para. 75 (Feb. 14, 2002) (holding that Belgium must cancel the arrest
warrant, because it disregards the immunity of the Foreign Minister of Congo from
criminal prosecution), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe-ijudgment_20020214.PDF
(last visited Oct. 31, 2002); see also Pieter H.F. Bekker, World Court Orders
Belgium to Cancel an Arrest Warrant Issued Against the Congolese Foreign
Minister, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. Feb. 2002 (reporting that according to the
International Court of Justice, Belgium must cancel the arrest warrant, because it
violates the principle of sovereign equality among states), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh82.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002); Frederic
Kirgis, French Court Proceedings Against Muammar Qadhafi, AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L., Oct. 2000 (mentioning that a French appeals court held that Qadhafi could be
prosecuted in France for the Lockerbie bombings and rejected the defense of
incumbent head-of-state immunity), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh56.htm (last visited Sept.1, 2002). The ICJ
ruling should now put a stop to that prosecution, which French prosecutors in fact
had opposed all along.
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The bottom-line factor for the surrendering state is trust. Regimes
that lack extradition treaties with each other probably do not trust
each other in the first place. So, would any "rogue" state again be
willing to try this type of ad hoc arrangement, given its probable
perception that promises are unlikely to be kept? One revealing
incident involves Nelson Mandela's response to the conviction of
Lockerbie defendant al-Megrahi. Mandela had been involved in
brokering the "extradition by analogy" arrangement two years
earlier. 170 In February 2001, the former South African president
claimed that the United States and United Kingdom had recanted on
their agreement to lift U.N. sanctions against Libya. He claimed that
the two countries had "moved the goal posts," by favoring
suspension of sanctions and imposing new conditions for their
complete dismissal, rather than their mere suspension.' 7' The Tony
Blair and George W. Bush administrations insisted that sanctions
would be lifted only when the Libyan government admitted its
official responsibility for the Pan Am 103 bombing, disclosed all it
knew about the crime, permanently renounced support for terrorism,
and paid compensation to the victim families. 7 2 The relevant
170. See supra note 26 (discussing the benefits of the impartiality of the Scottish
court).
171. See Anthony Sampson, Mandela Says UK Must Drop Libya Sanctions, THE
INDEPENDENT, , Feb. 9, 2001 (detailing that Mandela had Professor Jakes Gerwel
talk with Qadhafi as his personal representative two years ago); see also Chris
McGreal, Mandela Questions Lockerbie Verdict, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Apr. 10,
2001.
172. See Compensation Plea for Lockerbie Relatives, BBC NEWS, Mar. 14,
2002 (stating that Libya's obligation to pay compensation was not contingent on
the outcome of the appeal), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/1872440.stm
(last visited Sept. 17, 2002); see also S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 3033th mtg. at
51, U.N. Doc. S/Res/731 (1992) (according to paragraph 3, the government of
Libya must give a "full and effective response" to the requests to take
responsibility for the terrorist acts). Only the second and third of these four Blair
and Bush conditions, disclosure of the facts about the crime and renunciation of
terror, were conditions explicitly mentioned in the relevant U.N. Security Council
sanction resolutions. See id. The word "compensation" and the phrase "accept
responsibility" do not appear in the resolutions, only the vaguely worded "provide
a full and effective response." See id., para. 3; see also Symposium, supra note 17,
at 16 (clarifying that Libya had been on notice of the importance of the first of the
four conditions since at least November 27, 1991, when the United States and the
United Kingdom included it in their joint demand for surrender of the accused).
Moreover, by a letter dated March 19, 1999, from the Libyan Foreign Minister,
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Security Council resolutions, in fact, ensured only the immediate
suspension of sanctions upon confirmation of the arrival of the two
suspects in the Netherlands that had already occurred. The
resolutions specified that sanctions would not be lifted until the
Security Council concluded that Libya had complied fully with all
the requests and decisions made in the first two 1992 Lockerbie
resolutions. 
73
Was Mandela hinting about broken promises made in a "secret
deal" between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Colonel
Qadhafi, of the type that the Lockerbie families had suspected all
along? That is unlikely. The annex to Kofi Annan's February 17,
1999, letter stated that sanctions "shall be suspended"-not
"lifted"-upon his report that the two persons had arrived in the
Omar al-Muntasser, to Kofi Annan, Libya had agreed to pay compensation "if the
accused are found guilty." See Aust, supra note 25, at 295, citing UN Doc.
S/1999/3 11; see also UN Maintains Sanctions, Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site, July
10, 1999, (briefing that the United States vetoed the permanent lifting of sanctions
when the issue came up in the Security Council after the two Libyans arrived in the
Netherlands) at http://www.ltb.org.uk/displaynews.cfm?nc=20&theyear=1999 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2002).
173. See S.C. Res. 883, supra note 5, para. 4 (stating that the U.N. Security
Council declares its readiness to lift sanctions against Libya once the country
complies fully and effectively with the requests in resolutions 731 and 748).
Paragraph 16 of S/RES/883 required the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council within 90 days of suspension whether full compliance had
occurred. Id. See also S.C. Res. 1192, supra note 52, at 2, para. 8 (noting the
measures in resolutions 748 and 883 remain binding on all U.N. member states);
Annan Says He Can't Recommend Lifting Sanctions on Libya, BBC NEWS, July 2,
1999 (reporting that according to Kofi Annan's report, the U.N. Secretary-General
could not recommend lifting sanctions at that time due to the inability to assess
compliance with one condition: cooperation with the Lockerbie investigation and
trial through the prompt provision of evidence and witnesses), available at
http://www6.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9907/02/libya.un/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2002). At a press conference on the day the two suspects arrived in the
Netherlands, Mr. Annan stated that Libya would have to demonstrate that it no
longer backed terrorism and that it would honor "compensation requirements, were
the two to be found guilty." See Press Conference Transcript, supra note 77. The
latter could obviously not occur until after the trial. As for assessing whether Libya
had actually abandoned its support for terrorism, William Shawcross notes, "This
was a strange commission to give to the secretary general because the UN has no
intelligence arm. It was almost impossible for Annan to make a judgment."
Shawcross, supra note 26, at 345. To date, the sanctions are still under suspension
but have not been lifted.
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Netherlands.'74 What seemed especially surprising, nonetheless, was
not the differing interpretations of the Security Council resolutions,
but something that Mr. Mandela said publicly a few days after the
verdict:
The condition that Qadhafi must accept responsibility for Lockerbie is
totally unacceptable. As President [of South Africa] for five years I know
that my intelligence services many times didn't inform me before they
took action. Sometimes I approved, sometimes I reprimanded them.
Unless it's clear that Qadhafi was involved in giving orders, it's unfair to
act on that basis.
175
It is difficult to discern whether or not someone as sophisticated as
Nelson Mandela could believe that the Libyan Intelligence Services
would bomb an American aircraft without Qadhafi's knowledge and
authorization.' 76 As a lawyer, former head-of-state, and anti-
apartheid activist, Mr. Mandela surely understands the difference
between personal responsibility and state responsibility. Under
international law, the state, as represented by its government, is
responsible for acts or omissions by any of its officials, agencies, or
any person acting under color of law. Therefore, every act by a state
or its agents that is wrongful under international law imposes
international responsibility on that state. 77 Even where a state's
agents have acted beyond their authority (ultra vires), the state bears
174. See Attached Letter 3, supra note 30.
175. See Roberts, supra note 26 (describing Mandela's endorsement of the
proposal that the Lockerbie trial should take place in a neutral country, and that a
single country could not be "complainant, the prosecutor and the judge at the same
time").
176. See GERSON & ADLER, supra note 7, at 263 (asserting that Mandela is
undoubtfully grateful for Qaddafi's support of the African national Congress
during the anti-apartheid struggle).
177. See Report of the International Law Commission, United Nations
International Law Commission, 48th Sess., Supp. I0(A/51/10), arts. 1, 3, 4, 17, 18
(1996) (defining the responsibility of states and crimes against humanity); see also
Montreal Convention, supra note 38 (specifying that any person who performs
unlawfully and intentionally an act of violence against another person, destroys an
aircraft, or places on aircraft a device that causes damage commits an offence). See
generally Scott Evans, The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored
Terrorism, Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine, 18 MD. J. INT'L L.
& TRADE 21 (1994) (stating that the acts of the two accused Libyans constitute
offenses that violate the Montreal Convention).
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responsibility for all their acts that fail to conform to international
legal standards. 7 ' Compensation is the usual form of reparation in
such cases. 17 9 It too is another cost to be factored into a decision of
this kind. 180
B. QUESTIONS OF LEGITIMACY
Although there are many types of "legitimacy questions" that
could be posed about the compromise that allowed the Lockerbie
criminal trial to happen, only three will be raised here. They are:
first, whether the United States and United Kingdom gave away too
many concessions, thereby compromising justice; second, whether a
"voluntary transfer" that is influenced by economic pressures
undermines the trial's outcome; and third, whether a one-time-only
trial can ever be roundly considered as legitimate. The responses
given here to each of these questions are intended only as initial
reflections. Jurisprudential specialists undoubtedly will have much
more to say.
The first question is perhaps easier asked than answered, as there
is no objective measure of what is "too many." Surely, if Qadhafi
had in fact been given an actual "immunity deal" for himself and
other high Libyan officials, that would have crossed the line under
any form of measurement. If there had been such a deal, then the
entire arrangement could be dismissed as a travesty that impeded
178. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 423-28
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2d ed. 1973) (stating that in international law, a state is
liable for both intentional and negligent acts of its "morally responsible persons").
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 901(d) (1987) (stating that compensation is a common remedy
for monetary damage and that sometimes it might be required even though no
monetary damage has occurred).
180. See Libya Pays $30M + French Compensation, July 16, 1999, (reporting
that Libya managed to pay compensation to 170 families who died in the 1989
French UTA bombing for which six Libyans, including Qaddafi's brother-in-law,
were convicted in absentia), at
http://www.ltb.org.uk/displaynews.cfm?nc= 18&theyear=1999 (last visited Sept. 2,
2002); see also Trial in Absentia Begins for Libyan Suspects in French Jet
Bombing, CNN, Mar. 8, 1999 (mentioning that Qaddafi's brother-in-law was at the
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accountability for the worst terrorist act against civilians before
September 11, 2001. However, this article has demonstrated that the
early fears of some of the victim families' concerning the Annan-
Qadhafi agreement were misplaced. In terms of the other concessions
made for the Lockerbie trial, were they truly that different than those
sought, and often granted, to common criminal defendants in more
typical contexts? Plea bargaining often results in the defendant
dictating some of the conditions of his trial and sentence, including
venue, and crime victims rarely approve of it.' 82 Plea bargaining,
however, is much less common outside the United States,
particularly in Continental systems, whose prosecutors are granted
much less discretion than in adversarial systems.'83 Similarly, the
concessions concerning post-conviction made by the United
Kingdom, including access to the prison by Libyan and U.N.
officials, are not particularly unusual given the political sensitivity of
most transnational cases.'84 In fact, most dispute resolution in
international law is the result of arbitration or negotiation that by
181. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting the widespread rumors
and fears over whether a special immunity deal for Qadhafi had been reached).
182. See WALLIS, supra note 58, at 168-69 (asserting that Qaddafi would have
sought assurances from Annan and his envoys that sanctions would not be
reimposed at a later date).
183. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal
Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 433 (1992) (stating that plea bargaining is
generally not allowed by the European continental legal system in serious cases);
see also Albert Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 1003-11
(1983) (asserting that in American criminal procedure the defendant is a "subject,"
while in a European trial, the defendant almost never remains silent); John
Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
439, 443 (1974) ("What the Germans have largely done, and the Americans largely
not done, is to devise means to regulate the prosecutor's monopoly"); Joachim
Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 468, 468 (1974) (arguing that the
discretion of the German prosecutor is limited by the German Code of Criminal
procedure and by the courts).
184. See ICRC Visits to Persons Deprived of their Liberty: An Internationally
Mandated Task, Implemented Worldwide (declaring that it is a standard practice of
the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") to visit prisoners, monitor
their condition, and resolve problems raised by prisoners concerning their
treatment), at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList265/4C2DEI E5 ED3C7C9DC 12
56B660061123E (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
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definition involves compromise. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is a
prime example of international claims resolution.185
To those who believe that no compromises should ever be made
with terrorists, there are two responses. One answer that undoubtedly
will sound glib to hard-liners is that the suspects were alleged
terrorists, not convicted terrorists, when the pre-trial discussion were
taking place. Additionally, to paraphrase Lord Advocate Hardie,'86
the only plausible alternative to the Lockerbie trial was no trial at all.
Would a "no trial" situation really be a victory, and, if so, for whom?
The second legitimacy question could be answered facilely by
a further analogy to common criminals who at times may be
persuaded by economic considerations into accepting a plea bargain.
However, the comparison would be inapt, reflecting not merely a
difference of magnitude but also of kind. When long-term,
multilateral economic sanctions are imposed on a country, more than
just one defendant and his dependants are involved; an entire
population is affected. Moreover, negotiations over extradition, or
"voluntary transfer" in the case of Lockerbie, are never conducted
with the accused person. The decision belongs to the state, not the
suspect. Thus, factors that may influence a state to surrender him are
distinguishable from factors that may weigh into an individual
suspect's own decision to plead guilty.'87
185. See WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: THE
FIRST TEN YEARS 1981-1991 25 (1993) (stating that the use of international
arbitration has a long history in international law); CECILIA ALBIN, JUSTICE AND
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 1 (2001) (defining negotiation as a
decision-making process where parties reach a mutually beneficial agreement);
DAVID CARON & JOHN CROOK, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND
THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION, 369 (2000) (noting that the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has made an important impact on the process of
international claims resolution); VICTOR KREMENYUK, INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION: ANALYSIS, APPROACHES, ISSUES 1 (2002) (stating that the scope of
issues negotiated has increased nowadays).
186. See Hardie, supra note 17 and accompanying text (briefing the Lockerbie
victim's families on the status of the litigation).
187. Given that Libya's prohibition on extradition of nationals is statutory, not
constitutional, and is not required by international law, the two suspects in the
Lockerbie case could probably not claim a violation of their human rights when
Libya finally agreed to their "voluntary transfer." Libya has claimed, nonetheless,
that the suspects themselves, with advice from their lawyers, made the actual
choice to go to the Netherlands for the trial. See LOCKERBIE HANDBOOK, supra
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Perhaps a comparison to another recent "voluntary transfer," the
case involving the former President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan
Milosevic, to the International Criminal Tribunal ("ICT") in the
Hague, is instructive."8 Milosevic, whose trial for war crimes
commenced two days before the end of the Lockerbie appeal, was
swept out of office in October 2000 and arrested by Serbian republic
authorities in early April 2001. Existing Yugoslav law, however, did
not permit extradition of nationals. Furthermore, the newly elected
President, Vojislav Kostunica, a constitutional law scholar
committed to his country's rejoining the international community,
wanted Milosevic tried first domestically for corruption and abuse of
power. Like Qadhafi's pronouncement that U.K. and U.S. national
courts were prejudiced against Libyans, Kostunica also had stated
publicly that the ICT was biased against Serbs. When efforts to pass
a federal extradition statute failed in Parliament, the Yugoslav
government, whose Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, favored
Milosevic's transfer, enacted a decree authorizing it. This was
suspended on June 29, 2001, by the federal Constitutional Court; not
surprisingly, all of its members were appointed by Milosevic. Later
that same day, Serbian cabinet officials signed an order repudiating
the Court's decision and authorizing the republic's Justice Ministry
to extradite Milosevic immediately. With the assistance of British
note 12, at 3. It is not known what, if any, pressures the Libyan government may
have put on the two to influence their "choice."
188. Differences between the two cases are conspicuous, though not necessarily
dispositive. Milosevic was extradited to a pre-existing international tribunal, with
which all members of the United Nations are obligated to cooperate. Security
Council Resolution 827, S/RES/827 (1993), para. 4. In contrast, the Lockerbie
suspects were transferred to a specially created, one-time-only national court that
Libya had no pre-existing legal obligation, prior to the issuance of the mandatory
Security Council resolutions, to respect. However, Security Council Resolution
1192, supra note 52, also required all states to cooperate with future Lockerbie
trial arrangements.) Milosevic himself had formally approved of the International
Criminal Tribunal when he negotiated and signed the Dayton Accords in 1995,
whereas the two Lockerbie suspects played only an indirect role, if at all, in the
negotiations over their trial. Finally, the President of Yugoslavia opposed the
extradition of Milosevic; it was master-minded behind his back, whereas Qadhafi
signed off on the transfer of his nationals. See Lawrence Weschler, Comment: The
Defendant, THE NEW YORKER, July 16, 2001 at 27.
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and American transport, Milosevic was in custody in the Hague later
that evening. 89
Not coincidentally, the move to arrest Milosevic arose shortly
before the United States was to certify whether Yugoslavia was
cooperating with the ICT; this decision would determine whether the
newly democratic country would receive more than $100 million in
U.S. aid or be subject to economic sanctions. The actual transfer to
the Hague occurred on the eve of an international conference that
could allocate over $1.2 billion in aid. 190 Prime Minister Djindjic
fully acknowledged while commencing extradition that the country's
drastic need for economic recovery was next on his mind along with
enhancing Yugoslavia's international credibility. Djindjic stated,
"We lost ten years" and "[w]e cannot afford to lose another ten."
' '91
As a British journalist put it, "To a country full of impoverished,
underpaid and unemployed people, the message of economic
189. See Gordana Kukic, Milosevic Handover Thrown into Confusion; Court
Blocks His Transfer to War Crimes Tribunal as Reformers Vow to Press On,
REUTERS, June 28, 2001; R. Jeffrey Smith, Serb Leaders Hand Over Milosevic For
Trial by War Crimes Tribunal: Extradition Sparks Crisis in Belgrade, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2001 at Al. Ruses and decoys were employed to ferry him out, due
to the fear that the federal army would interfere. Carlotta Gall, Serbs Feared Army
Would Aid Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2001. Milosevic argued at the ICT that
his extradition was illegal under Yugoslav law. See Carlotta Gall, Yugoslavs Act on
Hague Trial For MilosevicL N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at Al; see also Ruth
Wedgwood, Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to be Tried in the
Hague for Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Allegedly Committed in
Kosovo, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. (2001). The decree was struck down as
unconstitutional later in 2001. See Belgrade Court Further Stymies Cooperation
with Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001.
190. See Peter Finn, West Backs Move Against Milosevic, WASH POST, Apr. 1,
2001, at A24 (stating that the U.S. decision whether Serbia was cooperating with
the Hague Court was going to determine some additional $50 million in aid for
Serbia); Mike Allen & Steven Mufson, Bush Ties Aid to Action on Milosevic,
WASH POST, May 10, 2001 at A6; and The Yugoslav Model, WASH POST, June 28,
2001, at A 32.
191. Martin Woollacott, Milosevic's Transfer Was the Price that Had to be
Paid, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, July 6, 2001, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4216916,00.html (last visited Sept. 2,
2002); see also United States Institute of Peace, Whither the Bulldozer? Nonviolent
revolution and the Transition to Democracy in Serbia, Aug. 14, 2001 (stating that
the surrender of Milosevic did not complete the transition to democracy in Serbia),
at http://www.usip.org/oc/newsroom/sr72nb.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
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rehabilitation is a powerful one, worth Milosevic's head and the head
of others in the future."'
' 92
The Milosevic comparison suggests two observations about the
legitimacy conundrum. First, economic considerations are often the
spur that prods transitional regimes that have much to gain from
cooperating with other governments to move ahead. The current
Yugoslav government replaced the Milosevic regime in a democratic
election while Qadhafi is still at the helm in Libya. In the post-Cold
War world, however, economic factors frequently are more
influential than ideology, and they probably will play a role in future
"voluntary transfers." Second, the coincidence of timing between the
Milosevic trial and the Lockerbie appeal demonstrates that the entire
field of international and transnational criminal law is now in a
remarkable era of change. As unprecedented as the Lockerbie
criminal trial was, the Milosevic trial, the first ever in which a former
head-of-state has been accused of crimes against humanity, is even
more so. It is therefore rather futile to try to assay the processes that
brought them about, when so much else in international law is in a
state of rapid flux.
The third legitimacy question raised here is the most troublesome.
This question asks whether ad hoc justice is ever true justice or
whether it will ever be widely perceived to be true justice, even when
the defendants' due process rights are scrupulously protected? Can a
"one-time only" trial ever be seen as legitimate when special
conditions are created for it and no matter how closely these are
designed to follow the "normal" rules and procedures? 93 Is it not the
192. Woollacott, supra note 191 (stating that many Serbs perceive the transfer as
necessary for economic motives rather than for justice); see also Mike Allen &
Steven Mufson, Bush Ties Aid to Action on Milosevic, WASH POST, May 10, 2001,
at A6 (mentioning the perception that Serbia has a "fresh start" after the surrender
of Milosevic); see Michael Dobbs, Hubris Brought Fall of Milosevic, WASH POST,
June 29, 2001, at A27 (reporting that the economic crisis in Serbia came after the
Government of Milosevic refused to introduce economic reforms for almost ten
years); see also Damjan de Krnjevic-Miskovic, Serbia's Prudent Revolution, 12 J.
DEMOCRACY 96, 108 (2001) (stating that economic and financial reforms started
after the surrender of Milosevic).
193. See Arnold Kemp, After Lockerbie, an International Court is Needed More
Than Ever, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Mar. 17, 2002 ("Such a court will always be
open to the allegation that it is under political pressure."), at
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likely result of "selective justice," in which the only cases that go to
trial are the ones with the greatest outside pressure?' 94
Many comparable questions were raised about the Nuremberg
Trial of the Major War Criminals. The most frequently articulated
criticism is that it was "victors' justice," as no international trials
were ever held concerning alleged Allied war crimes.'95 The
Lockerbie trial might similarly be labeled a post-Cold War example
of "victors' justice" that only the sole remaining superpower has the
clout to implement. 96 However, at least two of the more specific
criticisms of Nuremberg are not applicable to Lockerbie. First,
although the Lockerbie suspects undoubtedly were surprised in 1991
to have been identified specifically in the joint indictments, after the
United States held trials against the 1993 World Trade Center
bombers, a trial in 2000-2001 for international terrorism was not so
unprecedented as to constitute an ex post facto violation of the
defendants' rights. Second, the Nuremberg Tribunal's German
defense counsel were at a distinct disadvantage because they were
not familiar with the unique hybrid procedure used at the trial. 9 ' The
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Lockerbie/Story/0,2763,668890,00.html (last visited
Sept. 2, 2002).
194. See Diana Johnstone, Selective Justice in the Hague, NATION, Sept. 22,
1997 (implying that creating individual responsibility is the main reason behind the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia);
see also David Johnson, Terrorist Attacks on Americans (describing other terrorist
bombing trials before the Lockerbie case), available at
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/terrorism6.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
195. See THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (George
Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990) (arguing that allegations that
defendants have been mistreated while in prison were denied as questions of fact);
see also NUREMBERG: GERMAN VIEWS OF THE WAR TRIALS 53, 107 (Wilbourn
Benton & George Grimm eds., 1955) (stating that individuals who prepared and
conducted the war cannot be prosecuted under international law and that the
victorious powers from World War Two created the Nuremberg tribunal and
administered its laws); THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 35 (C. Hosoya et al., eds.,
1986) (observing that the Tokyo trials used the experience from the Nuremberg
trial).
196. OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE
FOR POLITICAL ENDS 323 (1961) (stating that victorious powers became the
"provisional, yet firmly established successors of the Hitler regime").
197. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 63
(1992) (stating that American and British lawyers, unlike German lawyers, have
experience in cross-examination; see also All the World's a Stage, BBC NEWS,
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two Lockerbie defendants, however, were each represented by teams
of prominent Scottish solicitors and advocates who were well-versed
in the relevant Scottish substantive and procedural law.'98 Indeed, the
only significantly ad hoc aspect of the Lockerbie trial was its
location in a third country -- the chief condition insisted on by Libya.
Accordingly, complaints of its illegitimacy are less cogent.
CONCLUSION
In retrospect, the Lockerbie "extradition by analogy" agreement
probably turned out to be less than fully satisfactory for any party
other than Scotland. It was given the opportunity to demonstrate to
the on-looking world that Scottish criminal justice is indeed
independent, dignified, and scrupulously fair to the accused. On the
other hand, the U.S. and U.K. governments spent an inordinate
amount of money to convict just one person and may always be
subject to accusations that they let the real culprit, the one who
ordered the bombing, go free. As for Libya, it may have expected a
different verdict, but the Colonel got exactly what he agreed to, an
authentic Scottish trial. To the Lockerbie victim families, the end of
the criminal trial is just the beginning of their struggle to obtain the
truth. 199 Finally, the United Nations, through a combination of
actions by the Security Council, ICJ, and Secretariat, achieved
something previously thought unachievable, a rapprochement of
Feb. 1, 2001 (describing that the well-known Scottish attorneys William Taylor
and Richard Keen represented the defendants), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/723699.stm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
198. See Legal Line-Up, BBC NEWS, Jan. 24, 2001.
199. See Buncombe & Sengupta, supra note 158 (stating that according to the
families, "the full truth behind the atrocities has not been revealed"); see also
Gerard Seenan, Relatives Demand Public Inquiry, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Feb. 1,
2001 (asserting that the conviction of one of the accused does not end the fight of
the families of the victims), at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/story/0,3604,431781,00.html (last visited
Sept. 2, 2002); Lockerbie Relatives Push for Answers, BBC NEWS, Feb. 1,
2001(stating that the families plan to continue to seek the truth), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/l148388.stm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); Gerard
Seenan, Relatives Say Fight Goes on For Improved Air Security, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Mar. 15, 2002 (reporting that families would like to see Qaddafi meet





sorts between two leading Western powers and. one of the most
obstinate Third World regimes. However, the Secretary-General may
not be pleased at having been reduced, more or less, to the role of
mere letter-carrier.
20 0
Perhaps, in time, it will become apparent that the entire Lockerbie
criminal trial scenario was sui generis, given the peculiarities of the
players and the uniqueness of the era. It was the product of a random
combination of circumstances unlikely ever to coalesce again. If so,
it was still the only viable, legal avenue of approach to a complex
problem; it was the best way out. "[G]iven the weird, brutal and
opaque nature of Gaddafi's rule, Annan's method of calm persuasion
may well have been the only way of trying to ensure that some of
those believed to be guilty of the terrible crime of Lockerbie were
finally brought to justice." ''
200. See Prez de Cu11ar, supra note 90, at 75.
201. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 26.
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I am writing with reference to your meeting with the Secretary-
General on 24 July 2000 at which the question of the release of the
Secretary-General's letter to Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhafi, dated
17 February 1999, was raised. As agreed at the meeting, I have the
honour to forward to you a copy of a letter of the Secretary-General
on the subject matter, dated 22 August 2000, addressed to H.E.
Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, Permanent Representative of the










the United States of America







I have the honour to refer to our meeting on 24 July 2000 at which
you referred to the trial of the two accused before the Scottish Court
sitting in the Netherlands. You raised the question of the release, in
response to a request by the defense team, of my letter to Colonel
Muammar Al-Qadhafi, dated 17 February 1999. Your Mission
subsequently provided a copy of the letter on the subject matter,
dated 3 April 2000, which had been sent to the Scottish Lord
Advocate by on of the Defence Attorneys writing on the instructions
of Senior Counsel.
At the outset I should like to emphasize that, in the performance of
my responsibilities, I am frequently engaged in exchanges of
correspondence with leaders of Member States of the Organization.
Unless the parties concerned agree otherwise, such correspondence
would not be disclosed to persons external to the Organization
because such unilateral disclosure may undermine the atmosphere of
trust that must remain between me and the parties concerned.
However, in view of the exceptional circumstances in the present
case, in particular the request of the defence team and the fact that
Security Council Resolution 1192 (1998) calls upon all States to
cooperate with the Scottish Court sitting in the Netherlands, I have
no objection to the release of the letter as requested. The
understanding is, however, that it is being released without prejudice
to the confidentiality of future correspondence with the leaders of
Member States and that it is released together with the present letter
which provides the necessary clarifications.
His Excellency
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, KCMG
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations
New York
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In this latter respect, it is important to place on record the
circumstances under which the letter to Colonel Muammar Al-
Qadhafi was written. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1192
(1998) of 27 August 1998, the role of the Secretary-General was
limited to providing assistance with the transfer arrangements of the
two accused to the Scottish court and to nominating international
observers. The transfer was successfully implemented after lengthy
negotiations which also involved efforts on the part of the
Governments of Saudi Arabia and South Africa. During these
negotiations the Libyan authorities sought clarifications regarding
various aspects of the implementation of the resolution. These
requests were conveyed to the parties concerned, namely France, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
The information provided by these parties in response to such
requests was then conveyed to the Libyan authorities. In response to
one of those inquiries and upon receipt of the necessary clarifications
provided by the British authorities, on 17 February 1999 I wrote a
letter to Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhafi concerning some of the
outstanding issues from the point of view of the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya. To the letter was attached an annex where the
clarifications provided by the British authorities were presented.
It is also worth noting that given the sensitive nature of matters
relating to the implementation of Security resolution 1192 (1998), all
the aforementioned parties concerned, including the United Kingdom
and the United States, were kept apprised by the United Nations
Secretariat of the contents of the correspondence between the United
Nations and the Libyan authorities. In the case of my letter to
Colonel Muammar A-Qadhafi of 17 February 1999, the United
Kingdom and the United States were apprised of the letter and, as it
appears from it, confirmed that they shared the understanding
reflected in its annex.










Leader of the Revolution
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Tripoli
Excellency,
I have been greatly encouraged by the reports I have received on
the outcome of your recent meetings with the envoys despatched
[sic] by the leaders of Saudi Arabia and South Africa. In particular, I
was very pleased to learn from President Mandela himself about
Your Excellency's letter to him dated 9 February 1999 confirming
the understanding reached on outstanding issues.
In pursuance of the understanding reached with the envoys, I
attach a document setting forth the relevant details thereof. After
reviewing this document, the Governments of the United Kingdom
and the United States have confirmed to me that they share the
understanding reflected therein. It is now my intention to report this
understanding to the Security Council without delay to facilitate the
immediate implementation of resolution 1192 (1998).
As Your Excellency is aware, the Security Council is due to
undertake, on 26 February 1999, a review of the sanctions imposed
on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Hence, it would be most helpful if
the practical arrangements already agreed upon between the Libyan
legal team and my own Legal Counsel could be set in motion before
that date.
Excellency,
I am deeply conscious and appreciative of your own personal
efforts in seeking solutions to the outstanding issues. It is heartening,
indeed, that the efforts made jointly by all concerned, as well as the
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leaders of South Africa and Saudi Arabia, are now about to result in
a satisfactory conclusion.




Understanding on the Issues outstanding from the point of view of
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
As provided for in Security Council resolution 1192 (1998) the
two persons concerned will be transferred from Libya to the
Netherlands and tried under Scottish law before a Scottish court
sitting in the Netherlands.
If found guilty, after any necessary appeals process, they will
serve their prison sentence in Scotland. If the two are not convicted,
they will be free to return to Libya unimpeded.
There is no intention to interview them, or to allow them to be
interviewed, about any issue not related to the trial. There will be no
deviation from Scottish law which provides that the two persons
have the right to refuse to see any police or intelligence officers. The
two persons will not be used to undermine the Libyan regime.
The prisoners would be held in a distinct portion of a Scottish
prison to provide maximum security. All necessary measures will be
taken to ensure the safety and well-being of the two persons, if
convicted. This facility will be given a special international
designation, and special arrangements will be introduced to provide
for a role for the United Nations in monitoring the treatment of the
two persons concerned. These arrangements, which will be subject to
discussions with the United Nations, will be regularly reviewed by
the British Government to ensure that they worked effectively and
satisfied the legitimate concerns of all parties.
The two prisoners would have unfettered access to legal and
diplomatic representatives. An official Libyan presence in Scotland
for that purpose will be allowed. Pursuant to the conditions of
imprisonment set out in the relevant Scottish law, religious, health
and dietary requirements of the two prisoners would be fully met.
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Visits by clerics and the supply of religious books would be
arranged.
The two prisoners or their representatives will have the right to
make representations to the authorities of the United Kingdom if they
consider that some aspect of their place of imprisonment was
contrary to humanitarian concerns. Any such representation would
be very carefully considered by the United Kingdom authorities.
With reference to the measures set forth in Security Council
resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993), these measures shall be
suspended immediately if the Secretary-General reports to the
Council that the two persons concerned have arrived in the
Netherlands for the purpose of trial before the Scottish court sitting
in the Netherlands. These measures could only be reimposed by a
new decision of the Council taken by an affirmative vote of nine
Members of the Council, including the concurring votes of all the
Permanent Members.
20021
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ATTACHMENT 4
Questions and Answers on the Release of the UN Secretary-
General's February 17, 1999 Letter and Annex to Libyan Leader
Mu 'ammar Qadhafi Prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, London, and the U.S. Department of State
Q - Why didn't the governments of the U.S. and UK release the
UN Secretary-General's letter sooner?
A - THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
UNITED STATES STRONGLY PUSHED FOR RELEASE, OF
THE DOCUMENTS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WAS
NO SECRET DEAL, BUT IT WAS NOT OUR DOCUMENT TO
RELEASE; IT WAS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO RELEASE.
U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN HAS NOW
RELEASED THE DOCUMENT. WHILE THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE U.S. AND U.K. STRONGLY ENCOURAGED THIS
DECISION, THEY RESPECTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S
PREROGATIVES.
- THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DECISION TO RELEASE
THE DOCUMENT SHOULD PUT AN END TO GROUNDLESS
SPECULATION AND SATISFY ALL PARTIES THAT THERE
HAVE BEEN NO HIDDEN SIDE AGREEMENTS.
Q - Does the annex set out special arrangements for the Libyan
accused?
A - NO, THE ANNEX COVERS CLARIFICATIONS OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN SCOTLAND AND THE
RIGHTS AND SAFEGUARDS WHICH ARE ENJOYED BY THE
ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL.
Q - Is the promise that the two suspects would not be used to
undermine the Libyan regime an assurance that the prosecution will
not target higher-ranking Libyan officials?
A - NO, THE PHRASE IN QUESTION HAS TO BE READ IN
CONTEXT - IT IS PART OF A PARAGRAPH THAT CLARIFIES
THE LIBYAN SUSPECTS' RIGHT TO REFUSE TO SEE
ANYONE. THIS PHRASE SPELLS OUT THIS RIGHT IN
RESPONSE TO LIBYAN CONCERN THAT THE U.S. AND U.K.
INTENDED TO SOMEHOW COERCE THE TWO SUSPECTS IN
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AN EFFORT TO UNDERMINE THE LIBYAN REGIME. THE
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT IS AFFORDED TO ALL
SUSPECTS TRIED UNDER SCOTTISH DOMESTIC LAW. U.S.
LAW AFFORDS THE SAME PROTECTIONS.
- THE PHRASE IN QUESTION ALSO MAKES CLEAR
THAT THIS TRIAL IS AN INDEPENDENT, LEGITIMATE
TRIAL OF THE TWO ACCUSED. THE SCOTTISH JUDICIAL
PROCESS CANNOT BE PRESSURED BY GOVERNMENTS
FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. THAT WOULD BE
ABSOLUTELY CONTRARY TO THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION. THE TRIAL UNDERWAY IN THE
NETHERLANDS IS NOT A SHOW TRIAL INTENDED TO
"UNDERMINE" THE LIBYAN REGIME.
- THE STATEMENT DOES NOT LIMIT IN ANY WAY THE
PROSECUTORS' FREEDOM TO FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE
WHEREVER IT LEADS.
- AS LORD ADVOCATE COLIN BOYD STATED, THE
SECRETARY GENERAL'S LETTER, DOES NOT INHIBIT HIM
IN ANY WAY FROM THE PROSECUTION OF THIS CRIME. HE
HAS PUBLICLY MADE CLEAR THAT HE CONSIDERS IT HIS
DUTY TO FOLLOW ANY EVIDENCE THAT COMES TO
LIGHT.
Q - If the two suspects decided to cooperate with the prosecution
and provide evidence against higher-ranking Libyan officials, would
the phrase in question prevent the prosecutors from indicting such
officials, on the grounds that this would "undermine" the Libyan
regime?
A - NO, THE STATEMENT IN QUESTION DOES NOT IN
ANY WAY LIMIT THE PROSECUTION'S ABILITY TO
FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE WHEREVER IT LEADS.
Q - If there was no secret deal, why did the governments of the
U.K. and U.S. delay getting this letter released, or why didn't they
unilaterally release it?
A - IT WAS NOT FOR THE U.K. OR THE U.S. TO RELEASE
THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CORRESPONDENCE. ONLY
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CAN RELEASE HIS OWN
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CORRESPONDENCE, ALTHOUGH THE U.S. and U.K.
REQUESTED THAT HE DO SO.
- CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL AND LEADERS OF MEMBER STATES OF THE U.N.
IS SENSITIVE. UNILATERAL DISCLOSURE CAN
UNDERMINE THE ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST BETWEEN THE
UNSYG AND RECIPIENTS OF HIS CORRESPONDENCE. WE
RESPECTED THE RIGHT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO
KEEP SUCH DOCUMENTS CONFIDENTIAL.
- THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE U.K. AND U.S. INITIALLY
SOUGHT RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE
LONG-STANDING WISHES OF THE FAMILIES. MORE
RECENTLY, ONCE THE LORD ADVOCATE AND DEFENSE
SAID THAT THEY WOULD PREFER THE LETTER AND
ANNEX TO BE RELEASED, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
U.S. AND U.K. DECIDED TO APPROACH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL AGAIN. WE SAID THAT WE HOPED HE WOULD
RELEASE THE CORRESPONDENCE IN THESE
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, AND HE AGREED.
AGAIN, THIS IS A UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCE, AND WE
COMMEND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DECISION.
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